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This capstone engages the history qigong, a Chinese method of spiritual and bodily 
cultivation. Although similar Daoist practices have existed for thousands of years, the term 
qigong was invented by the Chinese military in the 1950s. Qigong exploded in popularity in 
China from the early 1980s to the late 90s. The Chinese state promoted, appropriated, regulated, 
and ultimately suppressed qigong. On one hand, the Chinese Communist Party (henceforth the 
CCP or the Party) wanted to measure and order qigong according to orthodox scientific and 
political principles, thus processing and controlling the explosion of spirituality known as 
“Qigong Fever.” Yet on the other hand, both within and outside the state, many people witnessed 
the miraculous power of qigong, came to believe in it deeply, and wanted its spiritual and 
religious elements to thrive. The interplay of these two approaches—to measure and control vs. 
to experience and believe—drove the state’s interaction with qigong, feuling qigong’s rise yet 
causing its fall. Ultimately, the religious elements of qigong operated on their own terms and 
proved impossible to control.  
 
Keywords: Qigong; China; Religion; Spirituality; Science; Marxism; the State; Extraordinary 
Powers (​teyi gongneng ​特异功能); Bodies; Zhonggong; Falun Gong. 
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Introduction 
Last spring, I walked down the street in front of Taipei 101 and saw a man handing out 
flyers and booklets. A sign stood next to him, covered in graphic images: people with fresh scars 
on their sides, lying on hospital beds. I took a booklet titled ​Nine Criticisms of the Chinese 
Communist Party ​(​jiu ping gongchandang ​九评共产党​). ​I opened it and skimmed through the 
table of contents. The chapters read:  
“​What is the Chinese Communist Party?; The Origins of the Party; The Tyranny 
of the Party; The Party is Contrary to the Power of the Universe; Jiang Zemin 





 Suddenly, I realized this person was part of ​Falun Gong ​(法輪功, also known as ​Falun Dafa​ 法
輪大法), a religious group forced underground in China but perfectly legal here in Taiwan. In 
1999, after they staged a peaceful demonstration in Beijing, the Chinese government denounced 
Falun Gong as an “evil cult” (​xie jiao ​邪教) and cracked down on the group.  Reports by 2
journalists and the United Nations uncovered that the government was harvesting the organs of 
arrested practitioners to sell on the black market.  The man was protesting this horrific violence; 3
the people on the sign were from Falun Gong.  
1 Author Unknown, ​Nine Criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party ​(New York: Epoch Times Editorial 
Department, 2004), 2. (​Jiuping Falun Gong, Dajiyuan Xilie Shelun ​(​niuyue, dajiyuan bianjibu,​ 2004) (九评共产党
，大纪元系列社论 （纽约：大纪元编辑部，2004.)) 
2 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​183-184.  
3 David Kilgour and David Matas. “​BLOODY HARVEST: Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of 
Falun Gong Practitioners in China​: An Independent Investigation Into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun 
Gong Practitioners in China,” 31 January 2007. ​Organharvestinvestigation.net​; Manfred Nowak, “Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Addendum 19” (New 
York: United Nations Human Rights Council, 19 February 2008). Accessed December 18, 2019. 
http://www.falunhr.org/reports/UN2008/Torture-UN-08.pdf  
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But why would China attack Falun Gong in the first place? I often walked past small 
communities of practitioners on my way to work or class, watching them as they slowly moved 
between the postures of ​qigong ​(气功), a form of exercise and spiritual cultivation rooted in 
Traditional Chinese Medicine (​zhongyi ​中医, henceforth TCM). Falun Gong was just one kind of 
qigong, I knew— were they all treated this way? What could possibly be so threatening about 
qigong, practiced mostly by elderly retirees? Why did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) even 
care in the first place? I slipped the book into my pocket and thanked the man. But as I walked 
away, these questions reverberated in my mind.  
This capstone seeks to answer these questions, diving deep into history to understand 
how and why qigong was born, grew, and eventually provoked such a dramatic response from 
the CCP. As I have discovered in the past year, this will not be an easy task. In addition to the 
normal confusions of history (for which I highly recommend the timeline and reference page 
listed in the appendices), the story of qigong is full of paradoxes, ambiguities, and conflicting 
narratives. It’s often impossible to separate “real” from “fake,” neatly ordering everything so that 
it “makes sense.” Instead of letting this frustrate us, I hope we can let it excite us instead, 
pushing us to unpack this rich complexity. Yet even more difficult than the question of what 
“really happened,” I have found, is the question of where I “stand” on the events described (and 
where you should stand as well). This is a tempting but thorny question for religious scholars, 
and there are many valid approaches to it. I personally believe, however, that foregrounding this 
question prevents us from answering better, deeper ones.  As such, I’ll make an argument that 4
4 Closely related to the question of personal stance is that of authorial voice. Narrating is, inescapably, an act of 
power. With this in mind, I’ve tried to take an overall voice that avoids polemic from any side. At some times, my 
voice may fluctuate or mirror the subject I’m analyzing—when speaking from the perspective of qigong 
practitioners, scientists, or Party members, I’ll use their respective language and tone in an attempt to elucidate 
things from an “emic” perspective. If I didn’t take this approach, this entire capstone would be in scare quotes.  
 Cramer 4 
avoids normative judgements of any person or “side.”  To this argument we’ll soon turn, but first 
it’s important to understand the historical context of the qigong movement. 
 
Historical Backdrop 
This story begins at the end of the Cultural Revolution and the start of a new era for 
China. China in the 1980s was in a state of rapid economic, political, and social transformation.  5
With respect to qigong, three changes are important: the political climate became more 
moderate, broad ranging social and economic reforms were instituted (especially with regard to 
the healthcare system), and spirituality and religion returned. 
Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), a more moderate leader who came to power in 1978, 
promoted a few core guiding ideological concepts: “seek truth from facts” (rather than ideology) 
and the “Four Modernizations” (agriculture, industry, the military, and science and technology).  6
In doing so, he aimed to counter the excesses of the Maoist era,  instead relying on rational and 7
scientific thinking and policy-making. The CCP itself also changed, as Party members began to 
supplant ideology with technocratic solutions such as administrative networks and research 
5 Scholarship on the transition period is both deep and broad ranging. For a study on protest and contention between 
workers and the government, see: Diana Fu, ​Mobilizing without the Masses: Control and Contention in China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); for an ethnographic account of urbanization and “modernization” 
that can be extrapolated to many of China’s cities, see: Andrew Kipnis, ​From Village to City: Social Transformation 
in a Chinese County Seat ​(Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 2016); For a deep dive into the emergence of 
a middle class “identity” and its social implications, see: Jean-Louis Rocca, ​The Making of the Chinese Middle Class 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); For an ethnographic account of Chinese business culture and ​guanxi​, see: 
Elanah Uretsky, ​Occupational Hazards: Sex, Business, and HIV in Post-Mao China ​(Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2016); For examining how the Chinese state channels its youth into different educational tracks to 
fit the needs of its economy, and the stresses of this system on China’s youth, see: Terry Woronov, ​Class Work: 
Vocational Schools and China's Urban Youth ​(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015);​ ​For more 
ethnographic work on unemployment and alientation, see: Yang Jie, ​Unknotting the Heart: Unemployment and 
Therapeutic Governance in China ​(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015). For more background, see: Spence, 
The Search for Modern China​, 698-699. I will cite Spence’s reader frequently as background, and it serves as an 
easy gateway into other secondary work or source material.  
6 Spence, ​The Search for Modern China, ​587;608.  
7 Spence, ​The Search for Modern China, ​611-614. 
 Cramer 5 
institutes (like the State Science and Technology Commission).  However, the Party still needed 8
to assert its ideological authority; it still needed to guide China and put forward some sort of 
normative vision, as this was core to its legitimacy.  Thus, the CCP was searching for some kind 9
of deeper principle that could shore up its claim to govern as it guided the country through 
dramatic change.  
With regard to religion, the CCP moved away from aggressively Leninist, militant 
atheism and toward a more moderate stance.  In 1982, it published “Document 19,” which listed 10
the “acceptable” religions in China — Confucianism, Daoism, Islam, Protestant Christianity, and 
Catholicism — and placed them under the jurisdiction of the State Administration for Religious 
Affairs.  However, forms of “folk” religion outside of Document 19 had few options and faced 11
persecution as “feudal superstition.” Moreover, according to the document, religion “would not 
be permitted to make use in any way of religious pretexts to oppose the Party’s leadership or the 
Socialist system, or to destroy national or ethnic unity,” nor was there to be religious 
8 The growth of these extended structures of research/governance were critical to the success of the early qigong 
movement, as Party leaders could direct them to engage and grow the practice. Yoshiko Ashiwa and David Wank, 
Making Religion, Making the State: The Politics of Religion in Modern China​ (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 257. In fact, the authors argue that, “Academic associations were key to organizational legitimacy of 
qigong groups… [whose] members were mostly state officials who retired from ministries that managed the qigong 
organizations, with many having been responsible for managing them. In their efforts to spread qigong more rapidly 
these qigong associations created sub-branches that were registered with the parent organization, thereby offering 
them administrative legitimacy as well as some management expertise and access to various resources.” In a way, 
my work is an extension of Ashiwa and Wank’s. Still, the Party members’ direct involvement with these 
associations immediately dispels the notion  that they were merely “using” the qigong movement for political ends. 
Instead, it seems like from the outset, qigong had a solid number of people within the CCP who truly believed in it.  
9 Judith Farquhar, “Multiplicity, Point of View, and Responsibility in Traditional Chinese Healing,” in Angela Zito 
and Tani Barlow, ed., ​Body, Subject, and Power in China ​(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 135.  
10 Lü Daji, a prominent scholar at the time, helped define “religion“ as outside of Marxism in the mid-80s. See: 
Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​53.  
11 Richard Madsen, “The Upsurge of Religion in China” (Journal of Democracy, 21, 2010), 62. Document 19’s 
tolerance of religion was predicated upon its eventual death. This follows traditional Marxist analyses of religion as 
a phenomenon that only grows out of structural oppression. Once the economic superstructure shifts away from 
class oppression. For a translation of Document 19 itself, see: Donald MacInnis, ​Religion in China Today: Policy 
and Practice ​(Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books, 1989), 8-26.  
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involvement “in the administrative or judicial affairs of the state.   Thus, qigong operated in an 12
uncertain space. While it contained folk and Daoist elements, it could ​not ​be seen as “religious,” 
since that would make it illegal.   13
Running parallel to these ideological shifts were deep economic and social changes under 
the umbrella term “Reform and Opening Up” (​gaige kaifang ​改革开放). These reforms moved 
China toward a relatively open, semi-capitalist economy and largely eliminated social 
entitlements from the Maoist era such as the “Work Unit” (​danwei ​单位). A Work Unit was not 
just an economic arrangement, but also a source of communal identity: an entire family might 
rely on it for housing, study of “Mao Zedong thought,”  socializing, and perhaps even favors 14
from the local Party head.  Breaking this system led to large scale migration and social 15
upheaval. Perhaps most importantly, workers lost their healthcare as the medical field became 
privatized and profit-driven. This economic and social displacement, as well as the new need for 
healthcare, drove many people to turn to qigong.  16
12 Benjamin Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong ​(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 19​. ​Also see 
Document 19, cited above.  
13 Zhang Zhenhuan and Tao Zulai, “Today and Future ​— ​Some Thoughts on Qigong​ ​(Opening Address: First All 
China Qigong Science Academic Exchange Conference, Xingcheng, Liaoning Province, May 5, 1988),” in Hu 
Hangchang and Wu Qihui, ed., ​Collected Works on Qigong Science​ (Beijing: Beijing University of Science and 
Engineering Press, 1989), 4. Zhang chronicled qigong’s growth and influence, claiming that, “with the gradual 
dissolution of the dark clouds of “magic” and feudal superstition which covered it, a vast, mass-style qigong 
movement is now arising in China… having benefits and effects for society which are difficult to estimate.”  
14 For more on the structural changes to work, see: Kipnis, ​From Village to City, ​76; 94-95. Kipnis argues that new 
forms of work units or “work unit culture” have in fact emerged, which he terms the neo-danwei. “The neo-danwei 
form of [the workers’] organization,” he writes, “speaks to social desires that existed even before the 1980s and 
allows the continuation of a form of life in which a worker’s home and the social reproduction of his or her family 
are not entirely separate from his or her employment as a wage-laborer.” For the more coercive elements of studying 
Mao Zedong Thought, see: Spence, ​The Search for Modern China, ​553-554. It’s impossible to get around the fact 
that these forms of social organization came from direct Party intervention; as such, it could be argued Chinese state 
intervention in collective social identity has a long history.  
15 Uretsky, ​Occupational Hazards. ​Uretsky describes ​yingchou ​(应酬), a practice where businessmen treat Party 
members to dinner and buy them prostitutes in order to cultivate relationships and connections (​guanxi ​关系).  
16 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​1-5.  
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In this period of drastic change, religion—and especially “folk” religion —provided an 17
alternate route to community, ethical teaching, and reconceptualizations of the body and self.  ​It 18
countered the social anomie and alienation of living in a rapidly privatizing, industrializing 
society, helped people rethink and re-feel their cosmological place, connect with their heritage, 
and reclaim agency over their own bodies. Due to all these uses, spiritual practices boomed.  19
This fit the historical role of religion: the Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901), for example, took place 
in a similar context and was driven by similar motives. Just like the 1980s, China around 1900 
was grappling with transformative change due to modernization and its encounter with the West. 
And just like qigong practitioners, the boxers claimed that Daoist calisthenic techniques could 
transform how their bodies worked, both giving them miraculous powers and a renewed sense of 
cultural belonging.  Thus, the religious landscape in the early Reform period looked much like 20
17 The term “folk” has many connotations both within religious studies and the Chinese historical context. “Folk” 
religions have historically served as a foil to “world” or “great” religions, and thus tend to carry a derogatory 
connotation; they don’t meet the “universality” criterion of “world religions.” Moreover, “folk” religions are more 
likely to be seen as “unscientific” or “superstitious” by their detractors. These connotations were quite important in 
shaping the invention of qigong, as ​everyone in the movement had to try their best to avoid them. ​Qigong, in a way, 
was formed in direct opposition to “folk religion,” even if it shared its roots. For more on the creation of “world” 
and “folk” religions, see: Tomoko Masuzawa, ​The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism 
Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism​ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Masuzawa chronicles 
attempts by European philologists, especially Ernest Renan and Max Müller, attempted to create taxonomies of 
religion based on language (or a lack thereof). This discourse, he persuasively argues, has important implications for 
what “counts” as a religion in the first place—and can be seen clearly in Document 19.  
18 Scholar Xu Jian calls this the “Post- Maoist subject’s desire for a new body.” He argues the body in traditional 
Chinese though is, “constructed not as an individual, but as a social body which varies according to norms and 
structures [of society].” See: Xu Jian, “Body, Discourse, and the Cultural Politics of Contemporary Chinese 
Qigong,” ​The Journal of Asian Studies​ 58, no. 4 (1999): 963; 968. Nancy Chen makes a similar point. She 
specifically engages concerns for health in the new economy, and argues that qigong provided a new approach for 
many people in this regard. See: Chen, ​Breathing Spaces​, 45. Many of Chen’s larger arguments about the political 
implications of restructuring consciousness through qigong practice are relevant and will appear later.  
19 Yang Fenggang, ​Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule​ (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2012), 30.  Religion in post-Mao China, to use Yang’s economic metaphor, was a chronic “seller’s market.” During 
the Cultural Revolution, clear expressions of religiosity were not allowed, and as a result, a pent up “demand” for 
religious “goods and services” developed (i.e., funeral rituals, healing practices, guides to spiritual development, 
etc). 
20 Paul Cohen, ​History in Three Keys: The Boxers as History, Experience, and Myth ​(New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997). The Boxers (so named by Westerners because of their calisthenic practices) attacked both 
the government and foreigners. They slaughtered missionaries, including thirteen Oberlin missionaries and their 
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this earlier period: a wide range of spiritual practices circulated, largely outside the state’s sight. 
They promised new ways to understand the body and the cosmos as well as personal and societal 
rebirth,  and often culminated in mass spiritual experience through the guidance of a master.   21 22
Yet the Boxer movement culminated in social upheaval and a disastrous war for China. 
With this history in mind, the problem the CPP faced was how to eliminate dangerous, violent, 
“superstitious” (​mixin ​迷信) practices while preserving the health and cultural heritage of its 
population. To do so, the CCP sent lightly trained and equipped medical practitioners called 
“barefoot doctors” into rural China, breaking with earlier state practices.  Barefoot doctors were 23
supposed to use both TCM and Western medicine,  but they largely marginalized the former and 24
replaced it with the latter.  This undermined the social role of healers, family practice and 25
transmission, and largely flipped the traditional power dynamic between healer and healed.   26
Clearly, then, there were tensions between these two approaches to health and 
spirituality. On one level hierarchical, Western approaches to healthcare became dominant in 
children in Shanxi province; these victims are now commemorated by our memorial arch. For more information on 
Oberlin’s history with the Boxers, see: ​https://www.oberlin.edu/memorial-arch​.  
21 For more on the rediscovery/creation of the body as a proxy for rediscovery of identity, see: Farquar, 
“Multiplicity,” 78-80. Farquar argues that “the body is contingent not only on the vicissitudes of the natural 
environment but also on occasions of analysis and the purposes for which analyses are made,” which are “often 
framed as resistance to hegemonic Western formulations of the body.”  
22 Nancy Chen covers these healing sessions and forms of what she labels “psychosis” in depth. See: Chen, 
Breathing Spaces,​ 77-106. Chen’s​ Breathing Spaces ​is one of the core secondary sources that I’ve drawn upon in 
this project.  
23 They were called “barefoot” because, like the peasants, they would (ideally) labor in the mud without shoes before 
returning to the village to practice. In reality, however, given the drastic level of need, they spent almost all their 
time and energy on healthcare. Spence, ​The Search for Modern China, ​576; 634. 
24 “Defend Chairman Mao’s revolutionary health route,” a sign outside one barefoot doctor training clinic read, “by 
resolutely following the path of the integration of Chinese and Western Medicine.” Fang Xiaoping, ​Barefoot 
Doctors and Western Medicine in China ​(Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2015), 57. 
25 The reason for this shift, author Fang Xiaoping argues, was that Western techniques and pharmaceuticals were 
simply far more labor and cost effective. See: Fang, ​Barefoot Doctors​, 3 (displacement); 60-66 (for ease of learning 
and use); 67 (for pharmaceuticals)  
26 For example, doctors were expected to travel to the home of the sick and treat them there Fang, ​Barefoot Doctors​, 
14-16, 25 (social role of healers); 40-45 (family transmission). 
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official circles. When the state withdrew from healthcare during Reform and Opening Up, a 
techno-bureaucratic approach to health, operating from an impersonal but authoritative 
system—measuring, analyzing, and diagnosing bodies—remained.  These systems could reduce 27
subversive spirituality, but Chinese cultural heritage was unfortunate collateral damage.  Yet on 
personal levels, people everywhere were using qigong to re-feel and rethink their bodies, as well 
as their places in the world. Perhaps the Party could try, once again, to merge these two 
approaches through qigong.  
 
A Brief Definition and History of Qigong  
Etymologically, qigong is a combination of the character “​qì​” (pronounced chee, written 
气/氣) and “​gōng​” (pronounced like the instrument, written 功).  Qi is a fundamental aspect of 28
Daoist cosmology. All cosmic energy has a primordial, monistic source called the​ dào ​(rhymes 
with wow, written 道) . Energy from the dao becomes embodied​ ​as qi, or “life-energy,” so qi can 
be described as a “bio-spiritual” substance.  According to TCM, which is rooted in Daoist 29
thought, the amount of qi and its circulation through the body determine health, vitality, and 
power; a total lack of qi means death.  Essentially, Daoism (along with all traditional Chinese 30
27 Fang, ​Barefoot Doctors​, 17. To add insult to injury, this diagnosing and measuring was done largely by imported, 
foreign expertise.  
28 I’m going to maintain lowercase, unaccented transliterations of qigong, as I feel this avoids distraction and is 
closest to Chinese (which of course has no capitalization). Exceptions may appear in titles or specific schools of 
qigong like “Dr. Yan Xin Qigong.”  
29 For more descriptions of qi as “biospiritual,” see: Stephen R. Bokenkamp, ​Early Daoist Scriptures ​(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), 15-20. 
30 For an excellent discussion of health and the evolution of medicine in China, see: Unschuld, ​Medicine in China​, 
2010. Unschuld is a giant in the field of academic study of TCM. Unschuld describes two two qualitatively different 
aspects of Chinese medical systems writ large. The first is the  “durable paradigmatic core,” a “fundamental 
explanatory nexus” which governs cause-and-effect between phenomena. In this nexus, cause is determined 
inductively ​rather than ​deductively ​in the Western sense; i.e., if a fever is caused by an excess of the fire element, 
and a certain food contains the water element, then consuming this food will therefore reduce a fever. The second 
aspect is the “soft coating,” which governs, “perceptions of the nature of an illness-causing agent… functions and 
structure of the organism, [and] the formulation of behavioral norms designed for the prevention and treatment of 
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thought) is non-dualistic: that is, there is no distinction between the physical and spiritual realms.
 Because of this non-dualism, Daoist cultivation provides theoretically infinite spiritual 31
resources that may be converted to physical energy through qi​.  ​These resources, in turn, carry 32
the potential for total human perfection and liberation.  ​Gong​ means ​meritorious deed or 33
service, achievement, result, service, accomplishment, and work.   34
As a fusion of these two terms, qigong is fundamentally about developing the body 
through calisthenics and spiritual practice; it is a type of “body technology” that has deep roots in 
Chinese history and thought.  ​While the term qigong appears occasionally in older sources, it 35
first came into popular use in the 1950s when the CCP and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
promoted it.  The state viewed qigong as a tool of socialist mobilization, “putting qi to work” by 36
drawing on previous spiritual notions of health and vitality and embedding them within a new, 
illness.” These two aspects of medicine— the explanatory and the normative— are deeply intertwined. For more 
discussion of conceptions of qi, see: Robert Ford Campany, ​Making Transcendents: Ascetics and Social Memory in 
Early Medieval China​ (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2017), 43.  
31 For more on how the concept of ​qi ​is tied to (and stems from) the Dao, how the Dao transforms from an undefined 
monistic source of energy into multiple forms, see: Kristofer Schipper, ​The Taoist Body​, Trans: Karen C. Duval 
(Berkley; Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 61-62. For a good general discussion of Daoist 
cosmology and epistemologies, and a clarifying discussion of terms like ​qi, shen, ​and ​jing, ​see: Ronnie L. Littlejohn, 
Daoism: An Introduction ​(New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), ​xvi-xvii​; 66 (for qi’s specific role in nourishing 
health, especially through qigong-like exercises); and 72-74 (for a discussion of its circulation in relation to 
morality). Almost all discussion of Daoism must be rooted in its foundational texts, as these were continually 
referenced and built up throughout China’s history. The most important is the ​Daodejing​, written by the sage Laozi. 
Dao ​means “path” or “way,” ​de ​means “inherent character,” “inner power,” or “virtue,” and ​jing ​means “classic” or 
simply “book.” There are hundreds of translations of the ​Daodejing​. For a well referenced, scholarly version, see: 
William Theodore DeBary, ed.​ Sources of Chinese Tradition​, Vol. 2, (New York: Columbia Univ. Pr., 1999), 77-94. 
For a widely influential and more literary version, see: ​The Way and its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and its 
Place in Chinese Thought, ​Arthur Waley, trans. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1956). Although this study focuses on 
Daoist cosmology, Confucianism also possesses notions such as the “Supreme Ultimate” (太极 ), the source of all 
things and final law of the cosmos (promoted by Zhu Xi, among others). The Supreme Ultimate determines the qi of 
specific objects and is perhaps as applicable here as the Dao. For more, see: DeBary, ​Sources, ​701.  
32 Xu Jian, “Body, Discourse, and the Cultural Politics of Contemporary Chinese Qigong,” in ​The Journal of Asian 
Studies​ 58, no. 4 (1999): 969.  
33 Xu, “Contemporary Chinese Qigong,” 969.  
34 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​7; Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​5; Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong​, 5.   
35 For a flushed out explanation of the term “body technologies” and their role in Chinese history and thought, see: 
Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​1-10.  
36 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​5.  
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modern framework.  Other kinds of qigong were more explicitly Buddhist or Daoist and were 37
lacking these socialist undertones.  
As such, the boundaries between different “schools” of qigong, and around what 
“counted” as qigong in the first place, were hotly contested. Most practitioners would practice 
one school for a while, but freely switch if they stopped progressing, creating a “floating mass” 
of practitioners.  Qigong evolved and grew throughout the 1980s, reaching 60 to 200 million 38
practitioners by the mid-90s.  Capturing these floating practitioners and teaching them specific 39
forms of qigong became increasingly urgent, as they held vast political, cultural, and economic 
influence. Until the rise of groups like Zhonggong and Falun Gong, most qigong described in the 
paper is broadly similar, was supported by the state, and thus can be considered “orthodox.”  
 
The Argument 
This paper examines how healers, Party members, the scientific community, and ordinary 
people made sense of qigong.  First, it examines three figures — Yan Xin, Zhang Zhenhuan, 40
and Qian Xuesen — who were leading members of these three groups, respectively, and who 
formed a sort of coalition, leaning on each other for practical and political support. (I’ll refer to 
37 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​7; Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​5.  
38 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​194.  
39 The issue of counting numbers of qigong practitioners is difficult precisely because of the fluid nature of the 
practice. Moreover, state sources following the suppression tend to downplay the number of qigong practitioners, 
while sources from qigong groups do the opposite. Various estimates can be found in the introductions of ​The 
Religion of Falun Gong, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Breathing Spaces, ​and ​Qigong Fever.  
40 This is very much in line with David Palmer’s work. In ​Qigong Fever, ​another core secondary source for this 
project, Palmer states, “This book will argue that what makes ​qigong ​special is not so much the techniques in 
themselves… but rather the meanings ​qigong ​practitioners give to them, the reasons they want to practise them, and 
the social relationships created between people who promote, who teach, who learn, who practise, who don’t 
practise, and who oppose ​qigong… ​To practice ​qigong​, then, is not only to practise certain traditional body 
techniques, but also to participate in the elaboration of meanings and social relations around the goals and ideals of 
the ​qigong ​movement​” ​(Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​7-8)​.  
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these figures and the political/administrative networks that supported them as “the coalition.”) 
Each person believed in the broad-ranging importance of qigong for China’s future,  and wanted 41
to understand it as deeply as possible.  
The “extraordinary powers” (​teyi gongneng ​特异功能) of qigong masters, it seems, were 
especially important to the coalition. By perfectly cultivating and ordering their bodies, the CCP 
believed, these masters produced miracles. If they could somehow ​teach ​this proper version of 
qigong to the populace, it could solve many of the challenges listed above: the loss of meaning, 
the subversive nature of these cultivation techniques, the need for healthcare, etc. But in order to 
prosthelytize its own version of qigong, the coalition had to understand it first. And in order to 
understand it, the coalition blended together science, politics, and TCM to create a new and 
powerful system of thought. Next, the coalition sought to apply this system to studying how the 
masters’ bodies worked. This project culminated in hundreds of experiments that meticulously 
measured every aspect of the masters’ bodies and sought to detail how they produced miracles. 
However, just as important as measuring and recording the miracles was personally ​witnessing 
them. There was a core, religious element to the way qigong worked. Everyone, from masters to 
Party members, felt this power, and wanted to preserve it.   42
Moreover, the experiments the coalition performed were not just for individuals, but 
meant to apply to all society. The CCP believed that just as ordering the body allowed for 
41 Zhang Zhenhuan, the leading advocate of qigong within the CCP, referred to the movement as the transition from 
“the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.” See: Zhang, “Today and Future”. Yan Xin, the most important 
early qigong master, claimed, “The substantial qi of qigong has energies that can do work, similar to a nuclear 
warhead in a nuclear weapon. An organ which hosts qi is similar to a missile that carries a nuclear warhead…” See: 
Yan Xin, Hui Lin et. al., ed., ​Secrets and Benefits of Internal Qigong Cultivation: Lectures by Qigong Master Yan 
Xin​ (Malvern, Pennsylvania: Amber LeafPress, 1997), 58. Qian Xuesen, qigong’s leading scientist advocate, made 
similar claims.  
42 This argument highlights the ​humanity ​of people within the Communist Party. Often, the Party is seen as some 
protean, faceless behemoth like Orwell’s Ingsoc or Huxley’s World State.  
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miracles, so did ordering the “body politic” empower a society and allow it to recreate spiritual 
meaning.  In order to be “healthy,” however, the “qigong sector”  needed two things: a clear, 43 44
measurable organization that could receive “checkups” and “diagnoses,” as well as a spiritual (or 
even religious) core. As long as these two elements were present, qigong would be both powerful 
and non-subversive. Throughout the 80s and 90s, ​the interplay of these two approaches—to 
measure and control vs. to experience and believe—drove the state’s interaction with qigong, 
feuling its rise and driving it to splinter apart. ​Ultimately, the religious elements of qigong 
operated on their own terms and proved impossible to control.  
43 The term “body politic” is complex and deserves some unpacking. First, conceptualizing a society as a “body” has 
deep roots in Chinese thought, religion and history. Since ancient times, Daoist practices had conceptualized various 
“palaces” within “cinnabar fields” at various points in the body, such as the heart, kidneys, and liver. These palaces 
were filled with officials, and many forms of meditation consisted of navigating this network. For more, see DeBary, 
Sources of Chinese Tradition​, 235-282. In the early twentieth century, despite widespread attacks on TCM, 
educational reformers argued that understanding the anatomy of the body was inseparable from understanding the 
anatomy of the state. For more, see: David Leusink, “Anatomy and the Reconfiguration of Life and Death in 
Republican China,” in, ​The Journal of Asian Studies​ 76, no. 4 (2017): 1009-1034. In the Mao period, Mao’s bodily 
health and vitality also stood in for the health of the people. His historic swim in the Yangtze River at the peak of 
the Cultural Revolution set off a craze for swimming. See: Shuk-Wah Poon, “Embodying Maoism: The Swimming 
Craze, the Mao Cult, and Body Politics in Communist China, 1950s–1970s,” in ​Modern Asian Studies​ 53, no. 5 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019): 1450–85.  
I’m using the term “body politic” with this history in mind, but also in an anthropological way. The body 
politic, in this sense, breaks down into the various “organs” of its public, private, and state institutions: the 
education, health, economic systems, government bureaucracy, religious institutions, businesses, etc. In this 
metaphor, state organs are the eyes and the brain, whereas ordinary people and institutions make up the rest of the 
body. For more on the state’s “vision,” see: ee: James C. Scott, ​Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed ​(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998). In his work, Scott 
details how land reform and adopting uniform weights and measures in different contexts all made local practices 
“visible” and “legible” to the state, allowing it to enforce new regulations and laws. Thus, imagining a new, 
measurable order is a form of power. As we will see, this specific type of envisioning was very influential when it 
came to qigong. For the “thinking” aspect of the metaphor, see: Mary Douglas, ​How Institutions Think ​(Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 93. Douglas details how institutions and states seem to act on their own, “fix 
otherwise dynamic thinking processes, hide their influence, and rouse our emotions to a standardized pitch on 
standardized issues.” In the qigong movement, Douglas’ “institutional thinking” played out through various research 
organizations such as the CQRS and CSSS, which, due to their very nature as scientific institutions, strove to define 
and systematize qigong. The Party’s regulatory bureaucratic apparatus played a similar role in its research 
institutions, “thinking”  in a way beyond any individual by issuing and enforcing rules and regulations about the 
movement. While Yan, Zhang and Qian obviously didn’t read Scott or Douglas, it seems like these 
approaches—creating a bureaucracy that could both “see” and “think” in order to control “the body” of qigong and 
Chinese society—was core to their mission. 
44 The “qigong sector” essentially refers to the intertwined network of qigong practitioners, masters, scientists, and 
sympathetic Party members. For more on the term, see: Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​55.  
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This paper traces the story of qigong more or less chronologically. Part one of the paper 
begins with one of the most influential healers of the early 80s, Yan Xin, then moves to the 
politician Zhang Zhenhuan and scientist Qian Xuesen. It looks at primary materials from the 
three figures—lectures, books, speeches, and personal writing—to examine how each of these 
figures balanced, merged, or toggled between the two approaches to thinking about qigong. A 
new system of thought slowly emerged that blurred the boundaries between spirituality, politics, 
and science. It aimed to produce a common vision that was compatible with modernity, 
ethical/ideologically correct, scientific, distinctly Chinese, and miraculously powerful.  
Part two examines how Yan, Zhang, and Qian applied this new system of thought 
through experiments of “research councils” on the extraordinary powers of “qigong sensitive” 
people, such as masters or children. These experiments aimed to display how a perfectly ordered 
body, when combined with a perfectly regulated spiritual conviction, could produce miracles. 
The experiments were thus a sort of bridge between rhetoric and social application; they proved 
these new theories worked and that spirituality could be regulated, and thus paved the way for 
broader applications of qigong. 
Part three examines the CCP’s quest to bring this way of thinking to society as a whole, 
and how society responded. Some qigong groups, such as Zhang Hongbao’s Zhonggong, 
emulated the Party’s precise, orderly qigong, but lost the religious appeal that made qigong so 
powerful in the first place. Other groups, such as Falun Gong, did the opposite: they made 
overtly religious appeals to the people, and their lack of organization made them practically 
invisible to the state. Their widespread resistance finally uncovered a truth the CCP had buried 
deep beneath its qigong ideology: that spiritual experience is inherently subversive, breaking 
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down all categories, ideologies, and social constructions. This, the conclusion will argue, is the 
final takeaway of the qigong movement, the unavoidable truth that testifies to the immense 
strength of religion in the modern world.   
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Part 1: The Coalition 
Yan Xin 
Biography 
Yan Xin (1950-) was an important figure of the early Reform Period. He was a doctor, 
healer, and qigong master who developed his own school. Yan studied at the Chengdu Institute 
of Traditional Chinese Medicine (CIOTCM),  one of many universities founded to systematize 45
and “modernize” the study of TCM during the CCP’s early exploration of it in the 1950s.   The 46
CIOTCM trained both doctors and masters.  After completing his studies, Yan quickly rose to 47
prominence through “miraculous healing,” a common way qigong masters grew in popularity 
during the Reform period.  In 1985, Zhang Zhenhuan, a prominent general and member of the 48
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sponsored Yan, helping him rise to prominence.  Yet despite 49
his fame, the influence of the CIOTCM must have remained, because Yan remained loyal to the 
CCP and its mission to systematically understand qigong. This began the slow entanglement of 
science, politics, and religion that would prove to be so influential later on.  
As a loyal, powerful archetype of the ideal Chinese man and qigong practitioner, Yan 
was the perfect partner for the CCP. His well-ordered, well-cultivated body was like a map, his 
45 “About Dr. Yan Xin.” Yan Xin Qigong, International Yan Xin Qigong Association, 2002. 
http://yanxinqigong.net/aboutdryan/​.  
46 Ashiwa, ​Making Religion, Making the State​, 254. 
47 “UniRank,” Chengdu University of Traditional Chinese Medicine. Accessed October 28, 2019. 
https://www.4icu.org/reviews/725.htm#​. 
48 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​137-145. 
49 A prominent general and organizer of the qigong movement, Zhang invited Yan to go on a speaking tour and give 
lectures in front of audiences varying from ordinary people to high level Party members. He also promoted Yan 
through state media, journals, and documentaries. Some of this media even went so far as to rework the qigong 
movement in his image, describing the popular phrase “qigong fever” as “Dr. Yan Xin Fever” and its effects as 
“Yan Xin phenomena.” See: Jo Ann Wozniak, Stevenson Wu, and Hao Wang, ​Yan Xin Qigong and the 
Contemporary Sciences​, (Champaign: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Yan Xin International 
Qigong Association, n.d.​, ​1991), 5-10; Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​75-77.  
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teachings, a compass pointing toward a new, miraculous future. There were a few blank areas on 
the map, uncharted areas that only Yan claimed to know… but the CCP was willing to overlook 
this because Yan was such a powerful partner. By synthesizing qigong with the official scientific 
(and atheist) ideology of the CCP, Yan made qigong permissible and non-subversive; qigong 
was ​not​ religion, it was science. Yet at the same time, allying with the state allowed him to bring 
religious notions of faith and miracles into the political and scientific spheres. Science could 
categorize and measure the body, but so could TCM. Relying on science without the deeper, 
spiritual understanding qigong provided was useless. True understanding, one able to produce 
miracles and change peoples’ lives, could only be reached through qigong, and qigong could 
only be reached through Yan and the CCP’s guidance.  
 
Breaking Science 
Yan located himself on a historical continuum of Chinese healing practices that privilege 
the views and decisions of healers, allowing him to reconceptualize and re-order the bodies of his 
subjects.  Chinese medicine is quite different from Western medicine. Instead of relying on a 50
singular, objective “body” which exists prior to a diagnosis, Chinese healers “create” the bodies 
of the subjects they are healing out of multiple, equally valid epistemological frameworks.   The 51
body may be seen as a reservoir of different spiritual substances, a site through which ancestors 
act, or an open system of elements; Chinese healers regard each of these frameworks as equally 
valid “tools” for determining truth.  In other words, applying many layers of interpretation and 52
50 Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong, ​11;  Farquhar, “Multiplicity, 2. This reconceptualization, Farquar argues, is 
one of the core elements of healers’ powers.  
51 Farquhar, “Multiplicity,” 81-85. 
52 Farquhar, “Multiplicity,” 81-85. 
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meaning on the body help create a better, richer understanding of it. What makes Yan unique is 
that while most of TCM sought to subvert Western medicine by reframing its descriptions as 
“symptoms” while posting TCM-related causes as the deeper “root,”  Yan brought science into 53
his repertoire of interpretive “tools” on an equal level as TCM. If the CCP wanted to truly 
understand the body, it needed to abandon its obsession with science.  
Yan subverted the established hegemony of Western science when it came to labelling, 
measuring, and categorizing the body. For example, at the start of one of his lectures, Yan’s 
instructed his listeners on exactly how to sit, saying,  
“Please keep the head and neck straight… This way will ensure that your             
neckbone, or cervical vertebrae, ​is relaxed. Only this posture can correct the            
cervical vertebrae conditions. Our daily [activities] all lead to overbending of the            
cervical vertebrae from its natural curvature, which in turn frequently makes           
people feel dizzy, tired, and having poor memory… [this new posture] helps to             
normalize ​du mai, ​or governor vessel meridian, as emphasized in qigong           54
traditional chinese medicine and acupuncture. ​Du mai ​governs the overall          
immune system of the entire human being. It controls human vitality, energy, and             
the lifespan… it governs ​yangqi​.This posture automatically adjusts and enhances          
the du mai functions. It helps the ​qingqi yangqi or vital essence through enhanced              
energy work to bring out the ​du mai ​potential by itself. This makes our bodies               
change in terms of immunity and vitality and not get tired as easily.”   55
 
In the span of a few minutes, Yan repeatedly emphasized two terms: “cervical vertebrae” and 
“​du mai​,” both of which refer to the back and neck area. Yet he diagnosed the same symptom: 
fatigue, and gave functionally the same solution: better posture. In doing so he did not just argue 
that qigong techniques were scientific, but more importantly, he also argued that science was just 
53 Farquhar, “Multiplicity,” 94. 
54 Du Mai ​is the name of the channel on the back through which qi flows, one of the more important channels in 
TCM.  
55 Yan Xin. “Yan Xin Qigong,” YouTube video. 1:00:38. Jingui Golden Shield Qigong Austin, October 11, 2017. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tHug6h3KyCE&t=259s​.  
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another form of labelling what qigong already described.  No matter whether one uses medical 56
or qigong terminology to describe the body, he argued, the result was the same. 
In fact, science needed qigong’s spiritual guidance. In Chapter Three of ​Secrets and 
Benefits of Internal Qigong Cultivation, ​“The Scientific Nature of Qigong,” Yan argued, 
“science needs qigong to resurrect itself, and through the process of resurrection and renewal, 
qigong will enable science to make a great leap forward.”  Yan’s rhetoric here is striking. He 57
depicted current science as “dead,” completely inadequate for addressing the needs of the 
country. Science was something antiquated, fallen into decay.  Yet when it cooperated with 58
qigong, science could progress. Yan stated, “scientists should have a certain level of 
understanding of qigong and cooperate with qigong practitioners. Both scientists and qigong 
practitioners should, based on an ​equal status and a foundation of equality​, collectively design, 
explore, and closely integrate basic theories, application science, and application experiments”  59
(emphasis mine). Scientists needed to respect the knowledge qigong created before they studied 
it, because qigong was key to science itself; indeed, qigong was the missing piece that science 
needed. Thus, Yan’s message provided an impetus for “breaking” and reforming science together 
with qigong to create a new, better system of thought.  
56 The most important case of privileging scientific epistemology came from Guo Lin, another master healer, and Lü 
Bingkui, who worked for the State Administration of Chinese Medicine (which was under the Ministry of Health). 
In July 1979, Lü and 200 top officials and scientists met in Beijing, presenting various papers on qigong’s potential 
to treat cancer or bring about miraculous physical feats. This meeting provided a “green light” for the study of 
qigong, and was a catalyst for the entire movement. Yet implicitly, it established that only miracles performed under 
the approving gaze of scientists and Party members would be valid; thousands of years of healing, done in other 
locations like the countryside, still were “superstition.” For more information, see: David Ownby, ​Falun Gong and 
the Future of China ​(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​46-55.  
57 Wozniak, ​Yan Xin Qigong, ​32.  
58 Could it be that Yan was consciously ​challenging ​the Party by drawing on Great Leap rhetoric? After all, by this 
point in the midst of structural reforms (1991), the devastation of Mao’s policies had become clear. Could he be 
placing qigong itself as both the goal and method of revolution, directly parallel with Mao’s ideas of permanent 
revolution? I’m not sure if I’m willing to go this far, given Yan’s proximity to close party members. But the tension 
here—Yan’s conspicuous appropriation of Maoist rhetoric—is intriguing.  
59 Wozniak, ​Yan Xin Qigong, ​38.  
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Bioenergy and Bodily Transformations 
One of Yan’s core concepts—“bioenergy”—exemplified the power of this new system by 
how spiritual cultivation could be made physical, and therefore measurable. On one hand, 
bioenergy was like the soul for Yan. “Our approach to [bioenergy],” Yan claimed in his speech 
“What is Qigong,” “should take into account the functions and ideals of the individual. What one 
has in his mind, the nobility and depth of his thinking, the mystic quality of his thoughts, ​will be 
the precise character of one’s bioenergy​… The special trait of one’s character, especially in 
thinking and ideology, is ​embodied in one’s Qigong matter​ [aka bioenergy].” (emphasis mine)  60
Bioenergy was thus quite similar to Daoist notons of qi: both were biospiritual and non-dual, 
tying together one’s body and mind. Yet on the other hand, bioenergy was quite different from 
the soul: since it was physical and tangible, it therefore could be measured, classified, and 
controlled. Specialists could sort out different types of “qigong matter.” Thus, Yan used 
bioenergy to bridge the epistemological tension between “measurability” and spirituality.  
Understanding the paradoxes within Yan’s thought was only possible through a religious 
lifestyle and deep, spiritual experiences. In one of his lectures, Yan explained: 
Paying attention to the small things at hand, but forgetting the long term progress              
of a country and society is not enough… While doing and considering every             
action or thought, we must emphasize and produce virtue… even with grand            
virtue, we should accumulate more virtue. What kind of virtue exists beyond            
grand virtue? Mystery virtue. … We should elevate our character to a level such              
that our self is inseparable from other people and subjects… This merger is             
accomplished through our body’s skin pores, consciousness and thought         
processes, and the mental processes of being happy, angry, anxious, thoughtful,           
sad, fearful and frightened… If the concepts of great virtue, grand virtue, and             
mystery virtue seem religious to some people, they ought to master and apply             
these concepts… by doing this, one’s psychological state is no longer the same.             
60 Wozniak​, Yan Xin Qigong, ​22.  
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One’s outlook… on the universe has been adjusted… to a level based on high              
standards— a correct, complete, and scientific outlook on life.  61
 
Mystery virtue was a kind of final, total fusion between subjects and the cosmos, breaking down 
all barriers between physical reality, morality, and subjective experience. It was what made Yan 
so powerful, providing an underlying ethic for the physical processes of “bioenergy” he 
described earlier. This approach was tied to a political agenda, as practitioners had to keep “the 
long term progress of a country and society”  in mind. It was scientific and observable, 
“accomplished through our body’s skin pores.” But ultimately, there was an element beyond any 
kind of measurement, scientific or otherwise, that made qigong work: the religious one. Yan 
describes ego death and a total merger of “self” and “other”— both distinctly religious teachings. 
And he specifically disavowed religion because he knew that’s what he was advocating: a 
religious approach to life. Buried beneath layers of ideology that each attempted to describe and 
categorize Yan’s teachings was a kernel of religious teaching that had fundamental, 
transformative power. It promised that practitioners could reconnect to their communities that 
had been torn apart by the 1980s structural reforms, literally feeling each others’ emotional 
states. Cultivating virtue through Yan Xin’s qigong was a perfect way for China to respond to 
modernity on its own terms; it allowed for religious experience yet promised, “a correct, 
complete, and scientific outlook on life.” But people couldn’t get there on their own.  
As someone who had already cultivated bioenergy and mystery virtue, Yan possessed the 
authority to show others the way, and his body contained a wellspring of qi to share. “The real 
significance of Qigong does not appear on the surface,” Yan taught, “but exists in the internal 
61 Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​69-70.  
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absorption of bioenergy emitted by the master while giving his lecture or technical 
performance.”  In fact, these “lectures and technical performances” were critical to Yan’s rise; 62
hundreds of people flocked to his village every day, hoping to get a glimpse of Yan and absorb 
some of his qi,  and even high-level Party members attended some of his lectures.  No matter 63 64
how much he explained his teachings and talked about the importance of science, at the end of 
the day, Yan had no real need for it; the efficacy of his cures alone were sufficient proof for 
those who he healed, just as they had been for thousands of years.  Science was certainly part of 65
his system of thought as a way to explain how qigong worked. But it mostly served ideological 
needs, or helped him systematize and explain his teachings. Mysterious virtue was core to his 
power, and could only be understood after his subjects used qigong to see the cosmos from a 
higher, transcendent, holistic perspective—a perspective of all-encompassing knowledge and 
wisdom that came about through religious practice… a perspective of a master. Yan had already 
achieved this enlightenment, and the spiritual power deep within his body was proof. 
62 Wozniak​, Yan Xin Qigong and the Contemporary Sciences, ​18. 
63 At these gatherings, Yan was not the only one emitting qi; people would emit and absorb it ​together​. This ties into 
hopes for community once again, after the Cultural Revolution. For more, see: Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​145. Stephan 
Feuchtwang makes a similar point when discussing charismatic emission of and reactions to qi. He argues, 
“Ruptures and bursts of collective enthusiasm released through charisma should not be seen in opposition to 
tradition, but are in fact rooted in traditional hopes for transformation which present themselves as the memory of an 
idealized past.” Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming, ​Grassroots Charisma: Four Local Leaders in China​, 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 20. Perhaps ancient “folk” religion could re-spiritualize a disenchanted, 
modern world.  
64 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​75-77.  In fact, these lectures created something Yan called a “qi field,” a concept that 
essentially entails a collective field of energy which transforms the minds and bodies of those participating within it. 
The fact that Party members were part of this qi field is quite important, and will be covered later.  
65 Unschuld, ​History of Ideas, ​3-6.  
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Miraculous Transformations 
Yan brought together all the elements of his teachings—scientific, political, and 
religious— through stories of miraculous healing. In one, he visits an old woman who was 
unable to walk because her legs had compression fractures. He speaks to her doctor, silently 
examines her x-rays, and says he will talk to her, but worries “a wrong and ominous answer” 
may hinder treatment. Upon entering the room, Yan pretends not to know her and asks, “We are 
going to the Great Wall for a hike. Are you coming with us?” She happily jumps up and hikes 
the wall.  Through qigong, China could reclaim its identity, symbolized through the Great Wall. 66
In another story, Yan opens with, “On April 27, 1984, in the Chinese province of Sichuan, a 
young man on a bicycle was hit by a truck.” After discussing his injuries in a similar matter as 
above, Yan walks into the hospital and ​commands ​him to jump out of bed and do pull-ups. After 
being healed, the man claims, “I can now easily pry up steel ingots of seven to eight hundred 
pounds or carry three to four hundred pounds of steel, feeling no pain…”  Yan walked right into 67
a hospital full of doctors practicing Western medicine, one of the most prestigious positions in 
Chinese society at the time. And with his mysterious power, he made them look like fools. In 
both cases, Yan’s inexplicable yet authoritative power was able to restructure the bodies of those 
he healed, both changing them physically and allowing them to emotionally reconnect with their 
heritage.  
Yet Yan’s power didn’t just operate on a personal level, but could restructure all of 
society, to extraordinary effects. He covered this potential restructuring extensively in Chapter 
66 Wozniak, ​Yan Xin Qigong, ​32. 
67 Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​1-2.  
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Two of his book ​Secrets and Benefits of Internal Qigong Cultivation. ​The book claimed that in 
children and young people, qigong increased intelligence, school ability and “social 
consciousness.”  In adults, it reduced needed sleep to 1-2 hours a night and could “eliminate 68
fatigue.”  Qigong also helped women during menopause become less “talkative, irritable, and 69
offensive” so they can preserve their family relationships, and for the elderly it brings about 
“effective and direct extension of life” as the best “remedy for pessimism” so they can 
“contribute with housework and increase workplace productivity.”  Other extraordinary 70
abilities, Yan claims, can come from qigong practice, such as the ability to see oil and coal 
underground.  Thus, mass qigong practice could vastly enhance productivity and social 71
harmony. Elements that would have been especially challenging in Reform Era China, such as 
strained family dynamics and a concern for workplace productivity, were especially emphasized. 
This was one of the key elements that made it so attractive to the CCP not just for transforming 
individual bodies, but in reordering the entire body politic. If it adopted his teachings, all of 
China could become like Yan and obtain his power, solving the problems that the shift to market 
capitalism had caused.  
 
Conclusion  
Yan built a variety of intellectual currents and discourses into qigong. Qigong could bring 
about a higher and deeper understanding of the cosmos and allow practitioners to reconnect with 
themselves and their communities through religious experience, yet it also was scientific, 
68 Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​19-20.  
69 The book references a master who “had not slept for over sixty years” to show that “practicing internal qigong is 
superior to sleeping.” See: Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​20.  
70 Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​22.  
71 Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​26.  
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material, and easy to measure and control. The tension between systemazation and spirituality 
was overlooked because qigong was so ​useful, ​and because personal spiritual experience could 
prove that his teachings were true​.​ Qigong, it seemed, could do everything for everyone at once. 
Thus, the very contradictions and paradoxes core to Yan Xin’s qigong were integral to its rise, 
propelling him and qigong to fame in the early 1980s. Yan’s approach was taken up next by 
Zhang Zhenhuan, the leading advocate for qigong within the CCP. 
 
Zhang Zhenhuan  
Biography 
Zhang Zhenhuan (1915-1994) was a retired general who had fought in both the 
Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and the Civil War (1945-1949). He was one of the most ardent 
supporters of qigong within the CCP and on the public stage.  He was also involved with the 72
Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTID), which was 
formed in 1982.  Perhaps most importantly, Zhang spearheaded research into and publication 73
around qigong, founding several associations of scientists, Party officials, and qigong masters 
called “research councils” that aimed to systematize research into the extraordinary powers of 
masters.  
Throughout his time engaging the movement, Zhang toggled between three approaches: 
viewing qigong as culture, witnessing qigong as religion, and studying qigong as science. In 
doing so, he nimbly defended qigong, grew a deep conviction in its power among some Party 
members, and established its vast potential for remaking China. Zhang’s promotion of qigong 
72 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​75.  
73 Ibid. COSTID is a department that procures military equipment for the Chinese military. The implications of this 
will come out later and in the section on Qian Xuesen.  
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reflected the state’s paradoxical dilemma. On one hand, as long as the Party approached it 
rationally, they could understand, systematize, and control even the deepest and most mystical 
spiritual experiences. Yet on the other hand, the miraculous, seemingly inexplicable power of 
qigong masters was what made qigong so appealing in the first place. While Yan turned inward, 
resolving this paradox deep within his body, Zhang turned outward—to science. If scientists and 
the Party could chart the unchartable, they could unlock and control a whole new form of power.  
 
Defending Qigong as “Culture” 
Zhang needed to know how to categorize qigong, as what “label” qigong fell under had 
dramatic implications for the treatment it would receive from the state due to Document 19. In 
1982, in response to the rapid growth of state research into qigong, many prominent Party 
members led an attack against qigong as “pseudoscience.”  Zhang and his pro-qigong allies 74
fought back by creating a new analytical framework with which to see qigong: culture. The state 
TV station produced a documentary on Yan Xin titled, “Chinese Superman,” which praised 
qigong, its potential for healing, and its cultural roots.   Despite acknowledging Yan’s healing 75
abilities and growing fame, the documentary ended with a striking statement: 
“In its 3000 year history, ​Yan Xin is only a drop in the ocean​. As he puts it, he is                    
only one of the finger tips of those great Qigong masters. But ​just the ‘finger tip’                
starts a Qigong fever​. Qigong is neither superstition, nor miraculous medicine;           
74 The leader of this group was a politician named Yu Guangyuan. In a way, Yu serves as a foil to the entire qigong 
movement. Yu was an early critic of Lysenkoism, a Russian school of thought that believes ideology transforms 
scientific rules themselves. He instead consistently advocated for moderate political and economic policies, pointing 
out that Lysenkoism was a key factor in the disastrous Great Leap Forward. By the late 70s and 80s, Yu was an 
important political figure and thinker behind Deng’s faction of the CCP. For more on Yu and his influence on 
pulling the CCP away from Lysenkoism, see:  Li Peishan, “Genetics in China: The Qingdao Symposium of 1956,” 
Isis ​79, no. 2, (1988), 233. Struggles against Yu come up frequently in the primary sources of this study. Yet 
paradoxically, one takeaway from these conflicts was the authority of science to determine truth, setting the stage for 
Qian Xuesen and the scientific apparatus around qigong masters.  
75 Wozniak, ​Yan Xin Qigong​, 4-8.  
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neither a monster, nor an ancient achievement in scientific research. ​Qigong is            
Qigong; it is one part of Chinese traditional culture.​”  (emphasis mine) 76
 
The CCP goal was not to co-opt individual masters, no matter how influential they were. The 
only way to truly influence qigong was to co-opt the discourse around it, and the best way to do 
so was by emphasizing it as part of Chinese culture.  
On a deeper level, this shows the CCP understood qigong as a religion, since studying 
religion as “culture” reduces its ideological incorrectness and obscures its scientific inaccuracy, 
thus nipping these critiques in the bud.  ​Culture is broad and amorphous; it may contain 77
elements of history, religion, politics, morality, and even distinct epistemologies and 
cosmologies. Referring to any of these elements as “cultural” blurs the boundaries between these 
different fields, relativising them. Yet at the same time, since qigong was Chinese culture, it 
contained its own powerful, rich, distinctly “Chinese” truth. And as the guardian of China, the 
CCP could essentialize and control this truth for its own specific ends.  Just as Yan claimed that 78
the religious truths at the core of qigong were subjective and depended on spiritual experience, 
so did Zhang argue that qigong, as culture, was greater than mere science. Thus, Zhang did 
categorize and label qigong as culture, but in doing so intentionally gave it a label that 
paradoxically defied measurement and control of science or ideology.  
 
The Importance of “Witnessing”  
While the policies of Zhang and his allies may have relativized qigong within spheres of 
culture or health, their ​personal ​perspectives were much different. It seems they experienced the 
76 Wozniak​, Yan Xin Qigong and the Contemporary Sciences​, 7-8.  
77 Yang, ​Survival and Revival​, 55.  
78 Susan D. Blum and Lionel M. Jensen, ​China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom ​(Hawaii: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 2002), 10. 
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power of qigong much like many other practitioners at the time: deeply and spiritually. In 1982, 
the China Somatic Science Society (CSSS), an organization Zhang Zhenhuan had founded to 
study extraordinary powers, invited a charismatic qigong healer named Zhang Baosheng 
(1960-2018) to Beijing. Zhang Baosheng was one of the first healers to propose the idea of a 
“cosmic field”—a network of energy in which participation (usually through qigong practice) 
brought about extraordinary powers or even miracles.  Zhang Zhenhuan had Zhang Baosheng 79
demonstrate his extraordinary powers to the group, which included passing cigarettes through 
solid objects and making objects disappear.  The CSSS also confirmed his extraordinary power 80
through experiments.  Yet neither side stopped there. In fact, Zhang Baosheng actually travelled 81
into the Zhongnanhai compound, where all the top Party officials lived, and healed the Party 
members themselves.  Allegedly, Zhang Baosheng travelled to the home of Marshal Ye 82
Jianying (1897-1986), a high level general and one of the architects of the coup which overthrew 
the Gang of Four and put Deng Xiaoping in power, who had fallen ill with a respiratory illness.  83
Zhang emitted ​qi, ​stroked Ye’s chest, and revealed in his palm a handful of phlegm. He had 
extracted it from Ye’s throat. Party members participated in Zhang Baosheng’s qi field, to 
extraordinary effect.  
It would be easy to write off these stories as propaganda, concocted by Zhang Zhenhuan 
for his own political motives. But it seems this argument runs into several problems. First, 
79 Wu Xianghong, ​Paranormal in China, ​The Sceptical Inquirer, March 1, 1995. 
https://skepticalinquirer.org/newsletter/paranormal_in_china/​. Yan Xin clearly built on Zhang Hongbao’s notion by 
promoting “participatory qi fields.”  
80 Pamer, ​Qigong Fever, ​72-75.  
81 Song Kongzhi et al., “Research into Paranormal Ability to Break Through Spatial Barriers” in, “Chinese Journal 
of Somatic Science,” Vol 1, No. 1, (Beijing: China Somatic Science Editorial Department, 1990). These experiments 
are the focus of Part Two.  
82 Pamer, ​Qigong Fever, ​74.  
83 Pamer, ​Qigong Fever, ​74.  
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advocating for qigong during the “Four Modernizations” era was not a politically advantageous 
move. Zhang had little to gain from devoting himself to a movement that ran so counter to 
“seeking truth from facts.” Second, and perhaps more importantly, taking this perspective 
dehumanizes Zhang, turning him into a sort of machiavellian figure only out to manipulate 
others. There is no greater, fundamental mistake than assuming without evidence that the leaders 
of a country don’t care about the country they run, and that they only pursue narrow self-interest.
 Why would Zhang experience qigong differently than the thousands of other practitioners at 84
the time? A more plausible explanation for Zhang’s actions is simply that he was moved by 
qigong’s power and thought it could be useful for China. The nexus of belief, spiritual practice, 
and miraculous events is deep and complex; perhaps Zhang, like others, truly felt that he had 
witnessed these powers.  
 
Building, Guiding, and Controlling Qigong  
This is not to say that Zhang submitted himself to the authority of healers like Yan or 
Zhang Baosheng. Rather, by bringing traditional Chinese religious practices back under the 
purview of the state, he could guide their development. Zhang genuinely believed qigong could 
be measured, ordered, and controlled; his belief in qigong’s current power was tied to his belief 
in its potential. If qigong operated within the CCP’s ideological and scientific framework, then 
the CCP was its rightful inheritor and guardian.  As early as 1972, leaders within the People’s 85
84 My thanks to professor Darko Opoku for pointing this out. He was talking about leaders in postcolonial African 
states, but I often find it applies to China as well.  
85 This is in disagreement with Palmer’s vision of qigong’s ideological structure, which envisions scientism and 
marxism coming together to form a “utopian vision” for society (see the graphic in: Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, 
104-105). I believe both the different agendas and epistemological frameworks of actors involved prevented any 
coherent, unified direction toward a unitary utopian vision. Or, in other words, utopia wasn’t necessarily a ​goal ​of 
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Liberation Army (PLA) were attempting to build these frameworks. They claimed, reporting on 
the use of TCM in the army, that:  
The [doctrines underlying] the theory of Chinese Medicine — yin yang and the             
Five Phases — represent a kind of original materialism and spontaneous dialectic.            
They are an expression of opposition to the religious and superstitious doctrine of             
the existence of spirits; they incorporate the understanding that the world is            
composed of matter; they include the knowledge that all things are related to one              
another and that in all things the two forces of yin and yang are present in the                 
mutual dependence and mutual conflict. By adopting such perspectives to provide           
information about the prevention and treatment of illnesses, Chinese medicine has           
— over the course of history — been of enormous benefit for the development of               
our native medicine… [but these doctrines’] subjective guessing games inevitably          
lead [those who utilize them] to sink into idealism and metaphysics.  86
  
Zhang had been in the military for decades, so their conviction that the “uncorrupted” 
philosophical core of TCM could​ ​in fact be measured and ordered must have influenced him. It 
was simply that the “religious and superstitious doctrine of the existence of spirits” had caused 
TCM “to sink into idealism and metaphysics.” As long as one remained vigilant about 
succumbing to these “religious” concepts, it was possible to systematically understand and make 
use of these traditional Chinese ideas. Thus, the PLA’s ideological framework for understanding 
TCM supported the need to measure and order qigong, rather than just witness it.  
To accomplish this mission, Zhang set up “research councils.” The first of these, 
authorized by the Beijing Association for Science and Technology in December of 1979, was the 
Beijing Qigong Research Society.  It was composed of retired, qigong-practicing CCP officials 87
the movement, it was just one of its many implications​. ​The goal was to understand qigong for its own sake, on its 
own terms.  
86 Author unknown, “Report to the Committee of the Department of Hygiene under the Department of Logistics of 
the Army Unit Canton,” (Location unknown: PLA, 1972), p7, in Unschuld, ​History of Ideas, ​253. 
87 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​57. 
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and scientific researchers.  In September of 1981, Liu Guizhen, Guo Lin, as well as 120 masters 88
and scientists met to found the All-China Qigong Research Society (ACQRS).  By early 1986, 89
the number of research councils had proliferated greatly, resulting in the founding of the most 
well funded and supported institution yet: the China Qigong Science Research Society (CQRS). 
(The group eventually dropped “science” from its name.)  Zhang was president. In 1987, he also 90
founded the Chinese Somatic Science Society (CSSS), which specifically investigated 
“extraordinary powers” (​teyi gongneng​ 特异功能).  Of these organizations, the CQRS and 91
CSSS were most important. 
Yet although these research councils were allegedly scientific institutions, from the outset 
they drew on both political ideology and spiritual experience. At his marking the opening of the 
CSSS, Zhang put forward a vision for the study of qigong:  
Our work is guided by the philosophy of Marxism. How is it led? This should be                
very specific… when it cannot be explained in terms of old concepts and old              
viewpoints, we should create new things... Since [the study of qigong] is from             
qualitative to quantitative, the researchers themselves must have personal         
practical experience in the things they are researching… If you are doing research             
in human paranormal abilities, it would be best if you possessed paranormal            
abilities yourself…  92
 
Zhang argued that all those involved in qigong needed to have spiritual experiences to 
truly understand how qigong worked. This paralleled Yan’s assertion that his spiritual 
cultivation unlocked an incomprehensible “mystery virtue.” Spirituality, even within a 
88 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​57. 
89 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​57. 
90 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​75-76. Institutions that published qigong-related work include: the Guangdong Science 
Research Society, ACQRS, Shanghai municipal government, Beihaide “Qigong Hospital,” and the Beijing Qigong 
Research Society.  
91 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 77. 
92 Zhang Zhenhuan, “The Working Task of the Chinese Society of Somatic Science,” in “Chinese Journal of 
Somatic Science,” Vol 1, No. 1, (Beijing: China Somatic Science Editorial Department, 1990). Note: from 
declassified CIA documents. Declassified 08/11/2000, 14-15. 
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commitment to marxism and science, was the key for Zhang. It allowed access to a 
higher plane that could bend material reality itself. Yet just like Yan’s explanation of 
bioenergy, Zhang asserted that human thoughts and spirituality could become material, 
and thus, measurable. Order was still attainable. Science and Marxism could structure 
this spirituality, helping qigong practitioners process and understand it in the right way. 
Zhang continued to build on this project, both rereading qigong itself as an 
expression of the materialist progression of history and expressing the need to continue 
framing the movement this way. This was Zhang’s mission when he helped to establish 
the CQRS and CSSS. “Today and Future — Some Thoughts on Qigong,” was delivered 
at the CQRS in 1987, one year after its founding.  In this speech, after drawing on the 93
above narratives about the decline of qigong in “feudal” times,  he claimed that in the 94
postwar period, “the societal content of qigong has grown and become more important. 
The evolution of qigong clearly bears the traces of human social development and the 
progress of material civilization.”  As such, he argued,  95
the development of our nation’s qigong profession has entered a new           
stage. In this new stage it is demanded of us that we make a historical               
examination from the height of human civilization. This requires us to           
make a realistic estimate of the course we have walked and to carry out a               
strategic consideration of our future path​. The key to the problem is            
comprehension of “qigong” and an understanding of the relationship         
between “qigong” and the future development of human civilization.         
[qigong]... is the path from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.             
 (emphasis mine)  96
 
93 Zhang Zhenhuan and Tao Zulai, “Today and Future ​— ​Some Thoughts on Qigong​ ​(Opening Address: First All 
China Qigong Science Academic Exchange Conference)” (Xingcheng, Liaoning Province: May 5, 1988), 4, in 
Collected Works on Qigong Science, ​Hu Hangchang and Wu Qihui (eds), (Beijing: Beijing University of Science 
and Engineering Press, February 1989). Note: from declassified CIA documents. Declassified 08/10/2000.  
94 Ibid, 4, 8.  
95 Ibid, 9.  
96 Ibid, 4.  
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Zhang was not stressing this study of the past to bring about some abstract, intellectual 
understanding of qigong’s history. Getting qigong’s history “correct” was strategic in that 
it oriented the CCP’s attempts to control the future production of knowledge about it. 
This way, always aware of the potential for TCM to regain its religious component (as it 
did from Yan Xin), the CCP could repurpose it for socialist mass mobilization.   97
 
Conclusion 
Zhang clearly possessed a deep conviction in the power of qigong. The political climate, 
however, forced him to define it in multiple, overlapping and contradictory ways. To defend it 
against attacks from the CCP and to control the discourse around it, he called it “culture,” not 
religion. In scientific circles, he stressed a personal, spiritual understanding of it. Yet on a 
societal level, order was key. In each case, Zhang understood the ​realpolitik ​of measuring and 
systematizing qigong; its label determined who had power over it. Zhang thus drove qigong’s 
rise and institutionally embedded it within the state by masterfully navigating these dynamics. 
Qigong was brought into the body politic and made core to the CCP’s promise of a better future 
for its people. But its underlying religious nature remained, if not on paper, then in the hearts and 
minds of Zhang and his comrades. Whatever happened to qigong, no matter the criticism it 
received, they had witnessed its power, and they did not want to let it go.  
 
97 By 1991, Zhang felt that, “after several years of stable growth, the vast majority of activists who are really 
conducting scientific research or organizational and liaison work in somatic science have already been absorbed into 
our society.” He completed his goal, at least administratively. Yet in his speech, “Opening Address to the Second 
Session of the Second All-China Academic Symposium of the Chinese Society for Somatic Science,” he also 
stressed that scientists themselves ought to make qigong research their main focus and devote more serious time to 
it, rather than seeing it as a side job.  
This will come out further in the section on the experiments themselves.  
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Qian Xuesen 
Biography 
The final discursive thread that we must trace is science, the final character, the enigmatic 
rocket scientist Qian Xuesen (1911-2009). Qian’s personal transformation, from an American 
scientist to a political player in the CCP, was striking. He was born in China, but attended MIT 
on a grant, after which his professional development blossomed, culminating in his work on the 
Manhattan Project under the auspices of the U.S. government.  During the “Red Scare” of the 98
1950s, Qian was accused of being a Communist.  He decided to return to China, but was 99
detained for five years before he was eventually released.   100
This experience, along with living in isolation in a tumultuous China, must have changed 
Qian, because he quickly entered into the complex game of CCP politics (he eventually reached 
the Central Committee, a group of about a dozen most powerful decision makers in the Party) 
and developed a close personal relationship with Chairman Mao.  Qian preached the “Party 101
line” to other scientists, going so far as to publish a “self criticism”  that focused on his own 102
“bourgeois thoughts,” although this decision probably increased his ideological credentials.  103
His paper outlining a potential 20-fold increase in grain production won him favor with the Party 
98 Iris Chan, ​Thread of the Silkworm, ​(New York: Basic Books, 1996), 35. The grant he received was a “Boxer 
Indemnity Scholarship,” which sent Chinese students to the United States (mostly MIT), as a form of reparations for 
American Imperialism during the 1890s and 1900s.  
99 Chan, ​Thread, ​158-172. 
100 Author unknown, “Tsien Hsue-Shen Dies,” (California: Caltech Times, 2009).  
https://web.archive.org/web/20100612190920/http://today.caltech.edu/today/story-display.tcl?story_id=39604 
101 Chan, ​Thread, ​237-254.  
102 Self Criticisms were a common political stunt during the Maoist Era. Sometimes they were done freely, but far 
more often they were coerced. During the Cultural Revolution, self-criticisms became extremely widespread, and 
were often paired with other forms of public humiliation like the “airplane posture,” which forced people to stand 
hunched over with their hands in the air behind their backs for hours at a time. The political pressures of the Maoist 
era were extremely complex, yet they serve as an important pretext to this story and the“qigong boom.” For a good 
memoir on the era, see: Rae Yang, ​Spider Eaters​, (Berkley: University of California Press, 2013).  
103 Chang, ​Thread, ​239.  
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and may have been an impetus for the Great Leap Forward.  During the Cultural Revolution, 104
the faction Qian supported was ousted, and many of his friends were killed.   Afterwards, Qian 105
sided with the Gang of Four, leading to a diminished status within the Party after Deng Xiaoping 
took over.   106
While before it was possible to separate the spheres of science and politics, Qian’s 
experiences taught him that the way they structure “understanding” could be linked; that is, 
ideology drew legitimacy from scientific proof, and science had to meet ideological goals. 
Humans were not governed by the ironclad laws of science, but were blank slates upon which 
anything could be created, given the proper social circumstances.  Since Qian was a 107
representative of science in the public eye, much like Albert Einstein or Neil Degrasse Tyson, 
this shift had enormous influence. Suddenly, “qigong science” became not just acceptable, but a 
powerful framework both for the organization of the state and an understanding of the individual 
body. In other words, qigong became an all encompassing organizational principle. It didn’t lose 
its power because of Yan and Zhang’s internal contradictions, Qian argued. Instead, these were 
its strengths, the very things that made it true science. 
 
104 Chang, ​Thread, ​240. The degree to which Qian is a Lysencoist thinker is unclear, but the parallels are certainly 
striking. For more on Lysenkoism, see footnote 75.  
105 Chang, ​Thread​, 250-254.  
106 Chang, ​Thread​, 256.  
107 Steven Pinker provocatively suggests that this basic belief—the interdependence of nature and nurture, and that 
there are no “hardwired” elements to human nature—has served as a powerful tool for merging political ideology 
with seemingly objective research. A blank slate means that anything can be written on it. Qian, certainly, would fall 
into the group that Pinker critiques. See: Steven Pinker, ​The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature 
(New York: Penguin Group, 2002), 126-128.  
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Qian’s Spiritual Science 
For Qian, science was creative, expressive, and even mystical or spiritual. In his 1984 
speech given to a research council on Somatic Science, which was subsequently published in 
China’s biggest science journal “Nature,” Qian argued that science went beyond logic, since 
logic was merely used to explain ​post hoc ​what had happened or been discovered.  Instead, at 108
its core, Qian believed science was built on “creativity”; it consisted of “guessing,” which led to 
a “sudden realization of the truth.”  This rhetoric of sudden realization, along with the 109
destruction of previously held beliefs and systems of knowledge, was a clear overture to popular 
religious themes of enlightenment in China. Qian, like Yan and his mystery virtue, possessed the 
ability to stand outside of a rational epistemology. Through this new, spiritual form of science, 
he had access to a new perspective in which he could understand everything at once, intuitively.  
As a result, broader frameworks like “consciousness” had to become the true study of 
Somatic Science; only these objects of study bridged all systems and thus could account for the 
miraculous powers of qigong. Once these qualitative tools were used to understand qigong, the 
“data” they gleaned could be transmuted ​back ​into objective, quantitative knowledge. Qian 
claimed: 
The beginning point for answering a question is from a qualitative, confused,            
restricted perceptual knowledge. A model is compiled using different peoples’          
different feelings at different times... and is used to calculate data. It is also used               
to combine qualitative perceptual knowledge and actually measured data a little           
bit at a time… This ​elevation from qualitative to quantitative, from perceptual to             
the rational is true dialectical materialism. First, it is material, second it is             
108 Qian Xuesen, “A Memorable Important Day: Address Given by Qian Xuesen at The Symposium to 
Commemorate the Fifth Anniversary of Research in Human Paranormal Capabilities in China,” in​ Research into 
Human Paranormal Capabilities Quarterly ​vol. 2, editor: Research in Human Paranormal Capabilities, Editorial 
Department (no specific editor given), (Beijing: Nature Magazine Press, March 11, 1984), 5.  
109 Qian, “Important Day,” 5.  
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dialectical… This method will play a role in the next cultural renaissance.            110
(emphasis mine)  
 
Just like Yan’s mystery virtue, true Somatic Science integrated the subjective experiences of 
everyone involved, creating a new and powerful collective mode of understanding. This could in 
turn allow for a cultural rebirth. And importantly, this rebirth was the apotheosis of Marxist 
dialectics. Yet unlike Yan, Qian didn’t view this knowledge as hidden deep within the 
practitioner, accessible only through individual spiritual experience. At the end of the day, 
Somatic Science could transform and fuse together subjective, qualitative experience and 
objective, quantitative data. Thus, Qian was drawn to qigong because it fulfilled a need for a 
kind of total order, harmonizing even the subjective feelings of the Chinese people into one 
giant, understandable system.  
 
Qian’s Mission: Creation Medicine 
Qian believed that his organized-yet-spiritual science could allow people to gain 
extraordinary powers, while at the same time embedding an “orthodox” spirituality within them. 
In the same speech to the CSSS as above, Qian expressed this idea, saying: 
I feel there should be a fourth medicine [in addition to TCM, Western medicine,              
and reconstructive, organ-healing medicine] which is the stimulation of abilities          
which most people lack, paranormal activities. I shall call this, “Creation           
Medicine”. We must create ourselv​es, create a man superior to that created by             
“god”​... somatic science should study the fourth medicine.”  (emphasis mine)  111
 
By mastering and controlling the paradox that Yan and Zhang had so struggled with, the CCP 
could literally reorganize the bodies of its subjects, imbuing within them the power to produce 
110 Qian Xuesen, “Some Knowledge,” 1. 
111 Qian, “Some Knowledge,” 6.  
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miracles. This mission—producing subjects that could overcome all previous scientific and 
political limits to bring about miracles—mirrored Yan’s mystery virtue and emission of qi, since 
both authority figures (Yan and the scientists) channeled a spiritual source of energy (qi and 
dialectical materialism) to restructure and recreate the bodies of their practitioners/subjects.  
Qian, like Zhang, recognized that such a mission was a risky endeavor, but he believed 
the CCP had the authority and power to undertake it and prevent qigong from getting out of 
control. After thanking Zhang for his earlier defense of qigong,  Qian said, 112
Chinese Somatic Science Research is also guided by the Party…. In the past, in              
the [case of the] nuclear bomb, we relied on a unified leadership, relied on a high                
degree of political awareness, high degree of organizational discipline, and high           
degree of science. This type of organized integrated operations is what somatic            
science needs.  113
 
Qian was part of both American ​and ​Chinese nuclear weapons programs; he knew what it took to 
lead a successful mission. Only by centralized, powerful oversight of research into qigong could 
the CCP accomplish its mission, keeping qigong from sinking into various “traps” of idealism, 
religion, Western-ness, etc. Party leadership, control, “production,” and use of Somatic Science 
was crucial in harnessing the latent potential energy of the Chinese people and producing a 
“bomb” of national energy. Moreover, central control was crucial in protecting qigong against 
foreigners. “This method was the creation of the Chinese people,” Qian claimed, “The foreigners 
do not have it yet.”  With this new spiritualized, unified, and distinctly Chinese version of 114
science, Qian fully took up Zhang’s mission of using qigong to remake society, empowering it 
112 Qian, “Some Knowledge,” 1. It’s also covered by other Party members in ​Research into Paranormal Activities.  
113 Qian, “Some Knowledge,” 8.  
114 Qian, “Some Knowledge,” 6.  
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with nuclear bomb-like power.  Thus, Qian stressed central control because he believed it could 115
impose order on the study of qigong, controlling the direction of its development.  
 
Conclusion 
Qian’s vision represented a kind of fusion of all previous discourses covered so far. Far 
from shying away from the paradoxes they contained, Qian embraced them wholeheartedly. The 
people of China needed qigong to re-understand and recreate their own bodies, and the state 
needed qigong to reorganize itself. Collective spiritual experience was powerful, transcending 
the usual limitations of science and political theory. But the CCP had to guide, integrate, and 
control this new and powerful spirituality—something Zhang and Qian adamently believed could 
be done. The first step in starting this process, they believed, was through deep and prolonged 
research. It’s to these sources we’ll now turn.   
115 The theme of nuclear bombs is a common rhetorical and metaphorical thread across the thought of Yan, Zhang, 
and Qian. Often, the Chinese people possess a kind of “latent energy” that can be harnessed, just like the power of 
the atom, for national military rejuvenation, ending the “Century of Humiliation.”  
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Part 2: The Experiments 
The Experiments: An Overview 
Having examined the thought of Yan Xin, Zhang Zhenhuan, and Qian Xuesen as well as 
the history of the CCP’s engagement with qigong, we are now ready to look at the most baffling 
yet rich primary sources in the study: the experiments of the CQRS and CSSS.  Although more 116
of these experiments were presumably carried out and published, due to the limits of this study 
we will examine several “batches” of experiments published in: ​Research into Human 
Paranormal  Activities Quarterly​ (1984), ​Collected Works on Qigong Science ​(1987), ​The First 117
World Council for Exchange of Medical Qigong Abstracts ​(1988), and ​Journal of Somatic 
Science ​No. 1 (1990) and No. 2 (1991).   118
These experiments fused the two approaches​—​measuring and controlling vs. 
experiencing and believing—that the coalition used to think about qigong. This carried deep 
political consequences. The experiments brought personal belief into science and, as Zhang and 
Qian had asserted, thus allowed the believer to break science’s rules. The CCP had discovered a 
new way that qigong practitioners, and China in general, could become productive, healthy, and 
116  In these primary sources, a few minor problems of grammar appear. Chinese has no tense or plural, instead 
relying on context for these meanings. However, in English translations, this often results in confusing cases of 
subject-verb disagreement or tense shifts. In obvious cases, I’ve taken the liberty of fixing these problems, so that 
grammatical errors or clunky brackets will not distract from the meaning of the text. In more ambiguous situations, I 
use brackets. Speeches by Qian and Zhang are drawn from these same sources, as well as secondary literature, but 
perhaps due to their more general rhetorical tone their translations fared better.  
117 It seems likely that “paranormal abilities” is simply this translator’s choice to render of ​teyi gongneng ​(特异功
能), which I have been calling “extraordinary powers.” Throughout the sources, this translation remains consistent.  
118 Many of the following sources, as well as all of the transcripts from experiments conducted by the CQRS and 
CSSS, came from a project the CIA conducted called “Star Gate.” This project, according to information from 
public archives, aimed to use “remote viewers who claimed to use clairvoyance, precognition, or telepathy to 
acquire and describe information about targets that were blocked from ordinary perception.” It seems like the CIA 
was carefully monitoring China’s work on qigong in an attempt to emulate its results. For more information, see the 
CIA’s summary of the archive at: ​https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP96-00792R000701080001-1/page/n1  
 Cramer 41 
extraordinarily powerful. As long as they maintained faith in the Party’s version of qigong 
(which itself relied on faith, whether labelled as “dialectical materialism” or “creativity”)  they 
could counter the economic upheaval and loss of healthcare that had come with Reform and 
Opening Up. Moreover, the experiments brought analytical tools to personal belief and 
subjective experience. They measured and ordered previously unmeasurable, spiritual elements 
of qigong (such as TCM) according to both scientific and ideological frameworks, claiming to 
reveal a new, deeper understanding about how they worked. Since qigong represented a kind of 
perfected Chinese culture, this meant that the CCP could define, measure, and order cultural 
belonging, rooting out the elements that challenged its authority. Overall, then, the experiments 
showed how this final fusion could produce the perfect subject: spiritually advanced, culturally 
Chinese, and politically correct. 
The experiments all seemed to operate with four distinct steps: (1) they used scientific 
tools to measure and record the bodies of the subjects, establishing a harmony between science 
and TCM, (2) they ensured that the subject was “pure,” allowing their consciousness to enter the 
proper spiritual state, (3) they temporarily broke down all categories and emphasized the 
religious power of qigong through “witnessing” and (4) they reconstructed the subject according 
to this new, fused understanding, thus bringing together science, spirituality, political ideology, 
history, and Chinese identity under a single, new, powerful order.  
In the first step, science established that the previously unmeasurable—such as qi or the 
results of miracles—could in fact be measured. Scientific equipment was crucial for this process. 
This comes out most strikingly in the experiment, “Research in Restoring a Broken Leaf 
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Through ESP,” conducted in 1986.  In this experiment, different types of leaves were torn up 119
and handed to qigong masters, who emitted qi to mend the leaves back together. After 
confirming the leaves had mended, the scientists moved to advanced equipment, examining the 
leaves under a microscope, then ​again ​under an electron microscope. They then recorded careful 
notes about these images, especially on the “order” of cells which lined up again.  A similar 120
reliance on scientific tools appears in “Research into Paranormal Ability to Break Through 
Barriers (1990).  The miraculous act — causing objects or bugs to travel through solid glass 121
containers — is recorded from multiple angles, and the scientists discuss rewatching and slowing 
down the film to prove there was no deception.  These scientific tools aimed to collapse any 122
distinction between “subjective” and “objective” truth. Just as Yan had claimed many years 
before, science and TCM were both ways of labelling the same reality. 
This new “measurability” extended to the bodies of test subjects themselves. For 
example,  in “Investigation into the “Force” in Parapsychological Writing,” the researchers 
constructed sophisticated instruments to measure the mechanical, thermodynamic, and 
piezoelectric forces that the master emitted.  And in “Analysis of Tests on the Transmission of 123
Sensations Through Channels in Psychic Children,” scientists used a litany of devices which 
measure temperature, electrical current, blood pressure, pulse, and blood flow, attaching them at 
various acupuncture points on the subjects’ bodies.  These are just a few examples among 124
119 Wang Chongyuan et al, “Research in Restoring a Broken Leaf Through ESP,” in ​Chinese Journal of Somatic 
Science ​1, no. 2, (1991), 18.  
120 Wang, “Restoring,” 19.  
121 Song Kongzhi et al., “Research into Paranormal Ability to Break Through Spatial Barriers” in, ​Chinese Journal 
of Somatic Science ​1, no. 1, (1990).  
122 Song, “Break Through,” 57.  
123 Huang Jinggen et al, “Investigation into the ‘Force’ in Parapsychological Writing,” in,​ Chinese Journal of 
Somatic Science​ 1, no. 1, (1990).  
124 He Qinnian, “Analysis of Tests on the Transmission of Sensations Through Channels in Psychic Children,” in 
Research into Human Paranormal Capabilities,​ 40-41.  
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many. The deepest spiritual elements of TCM, elements masters might have claimed were only 
accessible through spiritual cultivation, suddenly became legible with scientific tools. The 
important thing here was not the actual measurements, data, or results in this first step. Rather, it 
was the ​process ​of “doing science,” a kind of performance that reproduced an “empirical” 
epistemological framework for interpreting the results.   125
The second step in the experiments’ progression was purifying the subject’s 
consciousness. This often came after the basic “qigong sensitivity” was established, but 
sometimes took place before it as well. “Each person being tested was​ ​ideologically prepared 
beforehand to ensure his close cooperation,” the first step of one experient’s methodology read.
 For experiments on children, the scientists always emphasized that their subjects earned good 126
grades, were obedient and well-behaved, and were patriotic.   Only these pure subjects had 127
access to extraordinary powers. Since qigong science was both a spiritual process and operated 
within principles of marxism, according to Zhang and Qian, it was important that the test 
subjects understood this and thought accordingly.  
The third, and perhaps most important step of the experiments was the moment in which 
the extraordinary power itself was demonstrated. In many ways, this moment was imbued with 
deeply religious components, culminating in a miraculous​ ​event that the scientists ​had ​to accept. 
125 In a way, looking in the mirror and thinking about how ​we ​view science makes this point obvious. Rarely does 
anyone ever truly look at raw data. This is because we feel that we don’t need to. The important thing is the 
framework which produces the data; we love to cite “studies” in any argument as a sort of powerful conversation 
ender. “Because ​science.​” Since the scientific method can’t be wrong, questioning “studies” becomes a challenge to 
truth itself.  
126 He, “Transmission of Sensations,”  42-43; Nai Chijing, “Research into the Psychic Magnification Effect,” 41-42.  
127 He, “Transmission of Sensations,” 43. This could also relate to Yan’s practice of having children serve as a sort 
of host for illnesses. In a few cases, he has children urinate out kidney stones of people who go to visit him (see: 
Yan, ​Secrets and Benefits, ​91). As ideal, pure, loyal subjects, children’s power had not yet been corrupted yet. This 
could also tie back to Vinyasa Buddhist practices that used children as spirit mediums, as professor Macomber 
pointed out.  
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Just like the Party members watching Zhang Baosheng perform, there was a deeply personal 
element to these experiments, centering on the religious element of “witnessing.” While 
scientists established that they could measure the “before” and “after,” they conceded that they 
fundamentally could never explain the “during.”  In one experiment on “Psychic Seal 128
Affixing,” which involved a child named “Z” reading letters inside a sealed envelope, the 
scientist was forced to concede that he couldn’t explain how it worked. Instead, he claimed, 
“This kind of perceptual knowledge from direct observation, after repeating many times, forced 
the observers to consider: the envelope… was no hindrance to “Z”’s psychic abilities.”  Seeing 129
was believing, no matter what. Moreover, the scientists didn’t hesitate to bring personal 
testimonials into the experiments themselves. “It should be noted that during the entire process 
of the experiment,” one recorded, “those persons being tested affected me very deeply in many 
ways…”  Just like Zhang Zhenhuan himself, the scientists professed a ​personal conviction ​in 130
the power of the masters.   131
128 Again, this ties back to some of Yan’s work. As mentioned before, he broke down the boundaries between 
scientific and spiritual epistemologies. Like Qian, Yan claims,  “Modern scientific methods do have limitations. In 
other words, ​the whole modern scientific paradigm, including its theories, technologies and precision instruments, is 
very restricting… ​completed qigong experiments are very narrow in scope… [and] cannot measure many of the 
indeterminate processes… the unobserved is much greater than the observed.” (Wozniak​, Yan Xin Qigong and the 
Contemporary Sciences​, 32) (emphasis mine)  We can see the influence Yan exerted on the experiments, stressing 
the core importance of a kind of religious faith as tied to both effectiveness and a greater understanding of the 
miracles themselves.  
129 He Qin-Nian, “Breaking Through the Obstacles of Space for Psychic Writing and Seal Affixing,” in ​Research 
into Human Paranormal Capabilities​, 25. 
130 Nai, “Psychic Magnification​,​”​ ​44.  
131 This naturally brings about the question: were the scientists colluding with the masters, lying through their teeth 
about the results of the experiments and merely using them for propaganda? This is definitely a valid question to 
ask, and the answer is probably: somewhat. But whether or not these miraculous events “really happened” isn’t 
especially relevant. After all, according to everyone involved they did, and this became the official line, influencing 
state policy further down the road. And the scientists must have had ​some ​conviction in the power of qigong, 
because why else would they risk their credibility and choose to work in such a fringe field? It’s important to keep in 
mind that many of those involved in qigong may have followed Zhang Zhenhuan’s exhortations to both take up 
qigong themselves and commit themselves personally to qigong in general. For the purposes of analyzing the 
motivations behind the experiments as well as their effects, then, it makes more sense to treat them as if they 
occured. 
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The scientists were not the only ones who were wonderstruck by this concept-defying 
religious power. In “First Investigative Activities for Human Psychic Functions Launched on the 
Tibetan Plateau,” the entire village showed up to watch three children (two Han and one Tibetan)
 display their powers. The image of a community coming together around these children would 132
be entirely irrelevant to a conventional scientific report, but here, it tied the entire experiment 
together. The empirical proof of these experiments found expression and use through the Tibetan 
audience; they could witness the performance and begin to ​believe​ in the new​ ​science and its 
power, and thus, tacitly, the power of the Party that created it. Thus, emotional and spiritual 
witnessing and personal transformation all remained core to qigong, even within the scientific 
and ideological frameworks of the experiments.  
Yet not wanting the experiments to hinge on this religious element, the scientists instilled 
order back within their subjects, reordering their body according to a new, synthesized 
framework. The primary way they did so was by establishing the “material substance of 
extraordinary power.” “Material” extraordinary power took many forms, such as energy 
containing information  or the potential for telekinetic force,  but one especially illustrative 133 134
example is “thought waves” and “matter waves.”  In this experiment, after failing to record 135
changes on any of their devices, the scientists, “lean[ed] toward the conclusion that there is no 
132 The inclusion of a Tibetan child builds on socialist ideology, signifying that accessing the “Chinese” identity and 
its corresponding extraordinary powers did not depend on ethnicity, but rather, proper moral behavior as a subject. 
As long as this was present, latent extraordinary power could be “activated.” It also makes clear overtures to 
Zhang’s mission of mass mobilization. The conclusion of the experiment claims that qigong could, “be used to ​build 
up the ranks ​of psychics… [the first steps are to conduct] an inducement study, then do repeated screening, then 
select those with stronger powers for directional training.” See: Authors unknown, “First Investigative Activities for 
Human Psychic Functions Launched on the Tibetan Plateau,” in ​Research into Human Paranormal Capabilities,​ 53. 
133 He, “Transmission of Sensations,” 41. The scientists claimed, “When [the test subjects] receive the information 
from the test card, which is transmitted along the veins to the brain, it stimulates those brain cells in a state of 
relative rest into an active state… [it] undulates within layers of the cerebral cortex.” 
134 Author unknown, “Tibetan Plateau,” 53-56. 
135 Huang, “Parapsychological Writing,” 65.  
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“external force” at work in parapsychological writing [that] cannot be explained using current 
knowledge… We envisage that ‘wave and particle dualism of nature’ may be one way to explain 
it.”  The scientists explain: 136
Persons with paranormal abilities transmit “thought waves” of different         
frequencies under different “states of excitation.” When these “thought waves”          137
come into resonance with the “matter waves” of the object being used, the “matter              
waves” … will be greatly increased... [the subjects] first use their thoughts to             
imagine the “pen” and when the “pen” appears in their “mind”, they imagine the              
object on which the pen is to write (paper, tape, etc). Finally, the “pen” will               
suddenly write or make a mark on the paper or tape in their minds with a flash                 
and the process is over.   138
 
The power of thought waves lay in their ability to creatively imagine a new reality. When the 
subject was in an excited state, he could bring this new reality into being; the guidance of the 
scientists and wisdom of TCM worked together, providing methods that could provoke this 
excited state. Furthermore, all of these mental processes operated within a scientific-ideological 
framework which the CCP created and guided; Zhang’s dialectical materialism, focused on the 
synthesis of seeming opposites and infused with a spiritual power (as opposed to mechanical 
materialism), provided the theoretical backdrop for the harmony between thought and matter 
waves.   139
136 Huang, “Parapsychological Writing,” 65.  
137 Similar concepts of the “excited state” appeared in, among others, the experiment on psychic children. The 
scientists sought to prove the materiality of information, claiming, “When [the subjects] receive the information 
from the test card, which is transmitted along the veins to the brain, it s​timulates those brain cells in a state of 
relative rest into an active state​… [it] undulates within layers of the cerebral cortex… [the substance] may be 
energy… [yet] must be launched repeatedly” (emphasis mine). He, “Psychic Children,” 41-42. This “active state” 
ties back into ideas of mass mobilization and total efficiency covered earlier.  
138 Huang, “Parapsychological Writing,” 66.  
139 Providing a theoretical backdrop for understanding the cosmos has always been part of the Chinese state’s role, 
from the reading of oracle bones to predicting eclipses and other astrological events. In his study on the Chinese 
state’s historical engagement with religion, Anthony Yu examines Confucian writings of “Anomaly accounts,” 
which, “not only sought to legitimize reflexively such accounts by acknowledging their unavoidable (read historical) 
occurrence past and present adumbrated in canonical sources, but also revealed the desire to domesticate the strange, 
the exotic, and the local by prescribing discursive explanation” In a way, these experiments can be read as a sort of 
prolonged system of anomaly accounts in Yu’s terms. For more, see: Anthony C. Yu, ​State and Religion in China: 
Historical and Textual Perspectives,​ (Chicago, IL: Open Court, 2005), 60-61.  
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This focus—bringing these religious experiences back into the material realm—became 
explicit in the experiment on the broken leaf. The scientists claimed, “​The individual 
consciousness becomes the main participant in the experiment.​ The so-called individual 
consciousness is, the author believes, the ideas of paranormal abilities.”  (emphasis mine) The 140
scientists, just like traditional Chinese healers, were not simply measuring a body that existed 
prior to the experiments. Rather, measuring the subject according to these new frameworks 
created ​the subject’s body and consciousness; extraordinary powers didn’t just stem from a 
transformed consciousness, but rather ​were ​the transformed consciousness. According to 141
Nancy Chen, “Thinking with the body illustrates how hegemonic institutions come to reside in 
the very core of one’s physical being and environment.”  These experiments, ultimately, were 142
about instilling a new order in the bodies of the state’s subjects, even if they took a few leaps to 
get there.  
 
Conclusion  
Everything was measured, everything was ordered, everything was controlled. Never 
mind that the core of qigong’s power depended on a deeply spiritual core and the convictions of 
140 Wang, “Broken Leaf,” 22. In Chinese, “so-called” (​suowei ​所谓) does not have the negative association it has in 
English. The scientist is simply defining individual consciousness as the source of extraordinary powers.  
141 This way of thinking actually has deep roots in the Chinese philosophical tradition, which may have informed it. 
Specifically, neo-Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming (and the mind-only school of Buddhism) made similar 
claims that the mind constructed all reality. See: Debary, ​Sources, ​849.  
142 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces,​ 13; David Palmer, “Embodying Utopia: Charisma in the Post-Mao Qigong Craze,” ​Nova 
Religio​ 12, no. 2 (California: University of California Press, 2008), 69–89. Chen refers to how qigong practice 
subverted ​these institutions (which I will cover later). But an equally valid interpretation of her point can take a top 
down approach, looking at how the state embeds these institutions in the first place. David Palmer makes a similar 
point. He argues that charisma and miraculous events can be understood within the context of “collective utopian 
expectations,” which become “embodied experiences” when a leader can link these expectations to specific feelings. 
Here, the experiments serve as a proxy for Palmer’s charismatic leader, but they orient the subject not just through 
their experience, but also scientific and ideological paradigms.  
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those who witnessed it. The experiments, for the CCP, were the logical conclusion of the 
epistemological and ideological groundwork that Yan, Zhang, and Qian laid. They put qigong on 
an empirical, material basis and showed its usefulness, blending together all the discourses they 
had drawn upon to create something extraordinarily powerful. It was time to show the world.  
 
  
 Cramer 49 
Part 3: The Qigong Sector Splinters Apart 
Introduction  
For the CCP, the experiments were not just meant to apply to individuals, but rather all 
society. The CCP conceptualized society like a body.  A practitioner could use qigong to 143
cultivate their individual body according to a powerful yet orderly framework, thus finding 
spiritual meaning, achieving extraordinary powers, and becoming a loyal subject. Perhaps the 
state, the coalition believed, could study and regulate the “body politic” just like they studied the 
bodies of people in their experiments. This could maintain society’s “health,” increase its 
productive power, and help it rediscover its Chinese identity.  Proper, politically “orthodox” 144
qigong practice was key to this mission. The CCP regulated the qigong sector because they 
believed that if it was well-ordered, it could produce a kind of ideal cultural ethos—one that 
maintained society’s spiritual vitality, yet was ​not ​subversive or challenging to the state​.   145
However, the tension within this mission—controlling the body politic according to a 
rational order yet promoting spirituality—caused the qigong sector to splinter apart in the late 
90s. The CCP’s fused, all-encompassing form of qigong was ultimately impossible to apply 
outside the lab. Initially, new groups like Zhonggong were ordered and regulated according to 
qigong orthodoxy. Yet Zhonggong failed. The rigorous scientific method that was supposed to 
legitimize Zhang Hongbao’s extraordinary powers instead undermined them. Worse yet, 
143 For a review of how I’m thinking about bodies and using the term “body politic,” as well as their history in 
Chinese political thought, see footnote 43 on page 13.  
144 This desire went all the way back to Yan Xin and the social benefits of qigong he promised in ​Secrets and 
Benefits of Inner Qigong Cultivation. ​See page 26. 
145 In order to understand this point, it may be useful to consider what happened when the government ​failed ​to 
intervene and regulate the practices of the body politic: the Boxer Rebellion. When the government allowed the 
Boxers to grow in an entirely unregulated way, it produced a violent, millenarian group.  
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Zhonggong’s advanced degree of organization merged perfectly with capitalism, not socialism, 
disenchanting and commercializing the practice. Having paid good money for spiritual 
transformation, Zhonggong practitioners felt scammed. Even if it built upon the ideological 
groundwork that the coalition laid, Zhonggong could not fulfill the coalition’s goals. Zhongong 
was making money, not miraculous cadres. As a result, Zhonggong lost state support. 
Zhonggong’s collapse showed that orthodox qigong, which the Party had so meticulously 
constructed throughout the 1980s, had no choice but to implode under the weight of its own 
internal contradictions. When spirituality was perfectly explicable through science, followed an 
orderly economic logic, and was perfectly politically correct, it ceased to be spirituality at all.  
In response to this collapse, more religiously oriented  groups like Falun Gong exploded 146
in popularity because they foregrounded religious experience ​on its own terms, ​shedding the 
other systematizing elements that orthodox qigong relied upon. Falun Gong resisted state 
intervention, rejected all forms of bureaucratization, and largely disavowed the discourses (like 
science and marxism) that legitimized earlier schools. At the end of the day, practitioners’ 
spiritual experiences—including the extraordinary powers of masters—defied the CCP’s efforts 
to label and control them. Spiritual experience broke down the layers of science and political 
ideology that earlier schools used to process and interpret it. Falun Gong and other unregulated 
schools were so dangerous to the CCP, therefore, because they carried the risk of “contagion”; 
they could bring unorganized, radical, religious experience into society. This would allow people 
to reimagine themselves within a wholly different cosmic order, re-feeling their bodies and 
rethinking their place within the body politic. Ironically, the very element that drew the coalition 
146 Like all qigong masters, Li Hongzhi argues that Falun Gong is not religious. Yet throughout his works, he 
maintains that Falun Gong is of the “Buddha school” of qigong, and he draws on religious concepts extensively. 
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to qigong—a religious core that possessed immense power, but that one needed to experience to 
understand—fueled Falun Gong’s rise, resulting in its final conflict with the state.  
 
The Rise and Fall of Zhang Hongbao  
Zhang Hongbao (1954-2006) was an influential qigong master in the late 80s. He 
founded a multi-million-member, multi-million-dollar qigong group: Zhonggong. At its peak in 
1987, Zhonggong claimed to have 38 million members.  For reference, that year the CCP had 147
46 million members.  Zhonggong is a shortened form of the school’s full name, “Chinese 148
Qigong for Nourishing Health and Increasing Wisdom” (​Zhonghua Yangsheng Yizhi Gong ​中华
养生益智功​)​. Zhonggong had many similarities with Yan Xin Qigong: both initially drew on 
networks of supportive Party members and scientists within the CCP,  gave a variety of 149
demonstrations and “qi emitting lectures,”  and outlined ascending levels of powers that could 150
be attained with devotion to the practice.  Broadly speaking, their teachings were quite similar: 151
they represented fusion of Daoist cultivation techniques and lineages, morality, and 
147 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​#.  
148 Stanley Rosen, "The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes Toward Party 
Membership and the Party's Image," in ​The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs​, no. 24 (1990), 55.  
149 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​146-150.  
150 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​146-150.  
151 For Zhang, these were described as “eyes” that one could develop. Each eye unlocked an ability to see and 
perform different miraculous feats. These eyes were the: 
1) Eye of flesh (perceiving qi)  
2) Eye of heaven (x-ray vision) 
3) Eye of wisdom (seeing into past and future, bringing messages)  
4) Eye of Dharma (telekinesis), and  
5) Eye of Buddha (changing people’s lives with wisdom)  
Interestingly, just as Yan’s highest level stems from “mystery virtue,” Zhang’s final level does not have to do with 
miraculous feats as much as it does with moral and intellectual ones. This perhaps speaks to the need for belonging; 
the highest level a trainee could achieve was the ability to personally touch others, reaffirming their humanity.  
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extraordinary powers.  And Zhang followed a similar path to fame as Yan, demonstrating 152
extraordinary powers, gaining academic and scientific approval, drawing the attention of the 
media, and garnering political support. Until his break with the Party in 1995, Zhang’s 
Zhonggong was like the perfect application of orthodox qigong within the body politic, fulfilling 
the coalition’s initial goals for qigong.  
From the CCP’s perspective, Zhongong’s organization was ideal because it brought 
regulation and standardization to the body politic. Zhongong possessed a well-organized 
administrative system,  and it marked its practice spots with signs or banners, categorizing 153
these spaces as distinctly its own.  Although initially many qigong groups had neither of these 154
elements,  over time thousands of other, smaller qigong groups imitated Zhongong’s basic 155
organizational structure.  From the Party’s perspective, Zhonggong was therefore immensely 156
beneficial. Suddenly, the Party could “see” and label different qigong groups, picking specific 
followers out of the crowd of previously amorphous qigong practitioners. Just like how scientific 
tools allowed the Party to track the flow of qi throughout the body, bureaucratic tools allowed it 
to track the growth and influence of Zhonggong and other schools like it, tracking positive or 
nefarious practices. With office headquarters in Beijing,  it was clear Zhonggong saw itself as 157
fitting into the body politic, supporting its order and health. 
152 For more on Zhonggong’s exact teachings, see: David Palmer, “Chinese Religious Innovation in the Qigong 
Movement: The Case of Zhonggong,” in Adam Yuet Chau, ed., ​Religion in Contemporary China: Revitalization and 
Innovation, ​(London: Routledge, 2011), 182-202. 
153 Palmer,​ ​“The Case of Zhonggong,” 9. 
154 Palmer,​ ​“The Case of Zhonggong,” 9. 
155 Such as the community Nancy Chen introduces at the beginning of ​Breathing Spaces.  
156 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 194. 
157 Palmer,​ ​“The Case of Zhonggong,” 9. 
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Furthermore, Zhonggong brought the Party’s qigong out of the lab, applying it in its 
training “workshops.” This was the coalition’s dream: teaching the people to practice qigong, 
cultivate their bodies and minds, and attain extraordinary powers on a mass scale. David Palmer 
explains the structure of these workshops as follows:  
It was a standardized training model, with its set curriculum and manuals,            
replicable in thousands of stations and centers across China. The stress was on             
output, with quantified targets for the sale of workshops. Workshops had a highly             
structured organization of time, in which each task, as well as the moment of its               
execution, was clearly assigned in written procedural manuals. Trainers were to           
systematically induce participants into a state of suggestibility… for instance…          
lengthen[ing] one’s finger by a few millimetres through mental effort [to] support            
the “mental force theory” (​yinan li lilun ​意念力 理论), one of the elements of              
Zhonggong philosophy. Seeing himself able to visibly prolong his finger, the           
participant saw himself as already in possession of a minor paranormal ability or             
“Extraordinary Power”; he could now believe in all paranormal phenomena, for           
which Zhonggong theory provided a conceptual framework. The idea that          
persistence in practicing Zhonggong would allow him to acquire even more           
paranormal abilities would motivate him to continue the training and practice with            
enthusiasm.  158
 
This training method parallels experiments in the CQRS and CSSS precisely. On one hand, order 
was important. The “master” (in this case the practitioner running the workshop) needed to 
follow a clear, measurable procedure, performing each task exactly. Doing so legitimized the 
event; it proved that the action’s underlying theory clearly applied, so long as the preconditions 
were met. Yet on the other hand, the training centered around “witnessing.” An audience 
surrounded the master confirming for each other that the miraculous event did in fact occur.  159
After seeing, the trainees could believe. Once they believed, they could “activate” their latent 
extraordinary powers (which naturally operated according to well-systematized “mental force 
theory”). Extraordinary powers were the “key” that opened the subjects’ minds to an entirely 
158 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​148.  
159 Although this quotation uses the singular for the trainee, there were often multiple.  
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new world, allowing them to transcend their bounded, ignorant ideas of physics and human 
bodies, awakening them to a higher reality where all conceptual boundaries broke down. The 
entire, precise structure of the workshop led up to this critical act. Thus, Zhang appropriated the 
coalition’s earlier experimental framework—and the fusion inherent within it—applying it 
within his own organization.  
However, the Party’s orthodox qigong did not advance a socialist agenda, but rather 
blended naturally with Zhonggong’s commercial goals. Making spiritual progress technical and 
measurable also made it easy to monetize. For example, Zhonggong charged practitioners for 
workshops like those covered above.  The organization also charged a fee, sometimes up to a 160
week’s wages, for attending one of Zhang’s “power-emitting lectures.”  At these events, Zhang 161
would emit qi energy, which his listeners would absorb before falling into trances, convulsing 
uncontrollably, dancing, yelling, and otherwise undergoing intense spiritual experiences.  On a 162
bureaucratic level, spiritual and economic progress were also tied together. Progress through 
eight distinct stages of Zhonggong’s training (which each carried their own powers) depended on 
how many new practitioners one recruited to the lower stages.  In all of Zhonggong’s 163
operations, Zhang insisted that since his qi constituted the organization’s “invisible capital,” 70% 
of profits generated by all its endeavors needed to be passed along to him.  Zhang’s claim—that 164
he possessed an economic ​right​ to the spiritual experience provided by Zhonggong—was 
plausible because the Party’s earlier ideological and experimental work had ordered, defined, and 
put this experience in the hands of all-knowing master figures. Whether practitioners purchased 
160 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever​, 148; Ownby​, Falun Gong and the Future of China,​ 75.  
161 Palmer, “The Case of Zhonggong,” 15.  
162 Palmer, “The Case of Zhonggong,” 8-9. 
163 Palmer,​ ​“The Case of Zhonggong,” 16. 
164 Ownby, ​Falun Gong and the Future of China,​ 75.  
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extraordinary powers or trance-like states, qigong was a commodity, the various schools of 
qigong, a market.  
 
Zhonggong Controversy, State Ambivalence 
The state responded ambivalently to Zhonggong’s growth, as while its version of qigong 
remained orthodox, its commercialization made it seem spiritually bankrupt. Through the early 
1990s, some members of the CCP and anti-qigong members of the public both began to attack it, 
accusing it of “quackery”  or of cheating people out of their money.  These attacks were well 165 166
founded: both Yan and Zhang Hongbao, for the first time, ​failed ​in their “qi emitting lectures” to 
bring about any sort of change in their listeners. A woman suffered a heart attack at one lecture, 
but since other practitioners were used to seeing others convulse and froth at the mouth, they did 
nothing, and the woman died.   167
On top of this horrifying event, a skeptical journalist produced videos that explained, step 
by step, how Zhang performed his “miraculous powers.”  Among those who witnessed these 168
failures firsthand and knew about these videos was Hu Ximing, director of State Administration 
of Chinese Medicine and Deputy Minister of Health. He shifted the state’s position on qigong 
from promotion to skeptical regulation; some masters, such as Zhang Xiangyu, whose methods 
induced glossolalia, were arrested.  However, Zhang Zhenhuan and others continued to defend 169
165 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 159-160. 
166 It’s also important to recognize the importance of the 1989 democracy movement and the subsequent crackdown 
at Tiananmen Square. Although too complex to go into here, the widespread pressure from civil society must have 
altered the CCP’s thinking about qigong at every level of the bureaucracy. Just as qigong became a tool for 
legitimacy when merged with Marxism, it could become subversive when paired with a liberal-democratic ideology. 
And indeed, as we’ll see with Falun Gong, the Party had become much more wary of mass movements. For more on 
the pro-democracy movement, see: Spence, ​The Search for Modern China, ​639-655. 
167 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 168. 
168 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 168. 
169 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 163. 
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the movement, and appealed directly to Deng Xiaoping, who reiterated the three nos policy 
(which included no publication of materials critical of qigong), perhaps because he had practiced 
himself.  As a result, Yan and Zhang’s failures were swept under the rug, blocked from 170
publication.   171
Party leadership wanted to preserve Zhonggong, even in the face of increasing blowback, 
because qigong was still useful for constructing the body politic. With both its administrative 
structure and its teachings, Zhonggong still fit the CCP’s need for order. And Zhonggong still 
drew on traditional Chinese ideas of the body, providing its own unique approach to healthcare at 
a time when the state was withdrawing from the sector. Even if Zhonggong’s practices felt or 
appeared hollow at times, it was better than nothing, the Party believed. Qigong was a way to 
respond to modernity on China’s (and the Party’s) own terms,  shaping what spirituality and 172
Chinese identity looked like. For this reason, Zhonggong was still valuable. The Party still 
controlled the discourse around qigong, so Zhonggong (and qigong more generally) was not a 
threat.  
Beyond Zhonggong, the CCP continued to regulate the “health” of the qigong sector in 
an attempt to salvage qigong’s reputation, and by extension, Party legitimacy. It seems that 
Zhonggong’s recurring crises had taught them that something was off with qigong—some 
element was either missing or corrupting the body politic, blocking the power that qigong was 
supposed to provide. In an attempt to track down the cause of this illness, the Party, led by Hu 
Ximing, created licensing and accrediting regulations for qigong denominations,  organizined 173
170 David Kelly, "Representative Culture: Official and Unofficial Values in Tension," in ​China Review ​16, (1991), 
1-26. 
171 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever,​ 168. 
172 Kelly, "Representative Culture,” 2. 
173 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​181. 
 Cramer 57 
qigong groups’ economic arrangements,  and even purged “low quality” masters, cutting them 174
out of the social body.  Now, ​all ​groups had to register with local officials, as well as post a 175
banner at their practice spot with their certifications and state regulations for qigong practice.  176
Moreover, government officials began to raid local qigong book stands for illegal qigong 
publications.  Overall, this regulation brought previously invisible “schools” of qigong (​gongfa 177
功法) under the purview of the state, allowing the state to see, classify, and then measure and 
evaluate them like a doctor checking a patient’s temperature. Only total control could find the 
elements that were causing Zhonggong to fail. However, as the Party was soon to see, these 
attempts would prove futile. The problems of Zhonggong, and orthodox qigong more generally, 
stemmed from the schools’ own internal contradictions—an excess of order, not a lack of it. 
Increased attempts at rigid order and control only brought increased spiritual resistance, driving 
the qigong sector into two separate camps.  
 
Popular Resistance to State Intervention 
Practitioners resisted state intervention in many ways. First, although many 
state-sponsored and state-suppressed schools of qigong, ideologies, and value systems competed 
and mixed throughout the Reform period, the mindset of ordinary Chinese people was quite 
relativistic, captured in the common phrase, “You do your thing and I’ll do mine.” (​ni zuo ni de 
174 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​169. I’m following Palmer’s lead here by referring to qigong groups with different qigong 
practices (​gongfa ​功法) as “denominations.” 
175 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​175.  
176 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces,​ 148-150  
177 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces,​ 148-150.  
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wo zuo wo de ​你做你的我做我的)  It sounds simple, but after such a prolonged period of 178
intense ideological conflict, it made sense for common people to be wary of such grand ideas.  
Another way people subverted state intervention in the qigong sector was by satirizing it. 
An underground publication in 1990, for example, targeted scientists, bureaucrats, and masters 
themselves. One cartoon depicted scientists with their heads stuck in sand exclaiming, “what is 
paranormal ability? It’s all superstition.”  Another depicted a bureaucrat labelled “soldier of 179
revealing qigong,” next to an aged tiger  dressed in cadre clothing. The caption read, “Turn 180
against one group and speak against it so another may benefit.”  And a third negatively 181
depicted a former master named Mr. Ma, whose “debunking” videos were so effective that the 
CCP purchased them and ran them on the state-run channel.  Taken in the aggregate, these 182
cartoons rejected the privileged position the CCP gave itself, and by extension, the notion that 
their spiritual practice depended on Party gatekeepers for legitimation. Scientists, politicians, and 
collaborationist masters had no place in the qigong sector, the cartoons seemed to suggest, 
because they clearly couldn’t understand its deeper, spiritual truth. These popular sentiments in 
many ways sowed the seeds of qigong’s collapse, as well as the rise of Falun Gong, later in the 
90s.  
Yet perhaps the most challenging, subversive element of qigong was not put forward by 
practitioners, but stemmed naturally from qigong practice. Throughout the 80s and 90s, a 
178 Ian Johnson, personal correspondence (November 9th, 2019).  
179 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​151.  
180 Tigers were common Daoist symbols of power and vitality. Thus, the old awkward tiger depicted a Communist 
party that has lost its power and isn’t really much of a threat.  
181  Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​152. 
182 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​67. The film Mr. Ma produced is fascinating. Disguised as a peasant, Ma demonstrates a 
variety of extraordinary powers to a local audience in front of a high school, swallowing glass, breaking bricks, 
breathing fire, holding back motorcycles with his teeth, emitting qi to a television, and more. Then, after vanishing 
off screen, he reappears in a Western suit and calmly explains how each trick was performed. The physical transition 
from illiterate peasant to a rational urbanite perfectly embodied CCP discourses on civilization and modernity.  
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phenomenon called “qigong deviation,” (​qigong piancha ​气功偏差) became increasingly 
common. During qigong deviation, practitioners would “deviate” from their normal 
psychological state, undergoing intense spiritual experiences beyond their control. Nancy Chen’s 
Breathing Spaces ​analyzes the phenomenon in depth, including several case studies.  One 183
follows a student who participated in the Tiananmen protests of 1989, fled but was arrested, 
practiced qigong in prison, and believed he developed extraordinary powers and could heal 
others. The student was diagnosed with schizophrenia.  From examples such as these, Chen 184
brings out the threat qigong deviation posed to the authorities as challenging, “the very 
foundations of scientific order that the socialist bureaucracy sought to promote.”  Thus, while 185
the Zhonggong controversy revealed how the CCP’s attempt to create rigid order in the qigong 
sector was spiritually bankrupt, qigong deviation revealed the other half of the coin: that many of 
the intense experiences qigong created were beyond control and categorization. By pathologizing 
these phenomena, the CCP attempted to cut these practitioners out of the body politic and thus 
protect it from contamination.  Yet this phenomenon persisted outside anyone’s control. As 186
long as there was qigong practice, powerful and subversive experiences were impossible to 
avoid. 
 
The Collapse of Zhonggong and the Qigong Sector  
183 Chen’s main idea examines the CCP’s desire for social order in light of its pathologization of qigong deviation. 
See: Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​101. 
184 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​101.  
185 Chen, ​Breathing Spaces, ​106.  
186 In this treatment of qigong, the CCP may have once again been influenced by the Soviets, who also pathologized 
behaviors that they viewed as irrational, and therefore subversive. See: Tricia Starks, ​The Body Soviet: Propaganda, 
Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State ​(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 4. Starks writes, “Soviet 
hygienists associated mental acuity, political orthodoxy, and modernity with lives lived according to the concepts of 
balance and reason… strong bodies generated balanced minds that would, in turn, choose the most rational, 
equitable, productive, and inevitable of political, social, and economic structures, namely, socialism.” 
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The controversy around qigong reached its first peak with the death of Zhang Zhenhuan 
in 1994 and the publication of Yan and Zhang Hongbao’s failures in 1995.  Zhang Zhenhuan 187
legitimized qigong from a political perspective, maintained that its materialist and Marxist roots 
helped it strengthen the state, and set up an academic and bureaucratic structure that mirrored 
this conviction. His death, then, not only took away one of qigong’s biggest advocates, but also 
called into question the underlying logic behind the entire structure he set up. After all, many of 
the local bureaus tasked with regulating qigong were more concerned with sharing the profits 
garnered from Zhonggong's organizational model than actually controlling the teaching of the 
qigong group itself.  And because the Reform period Chinese state operated off a “fragmented 188
authoritarian” model  with many layers of discretion at lower levels, even if these authorities 189
could measure, order, and control qigong groups, they also allowed them to buy their way into 
national associations. This prompted many allegations of corruption from all sides. Thus, while 
the CCP continued in its attempts to sponsor orderly, measurable, controllable qigong, this very 
interaction revealed the qigong as spiritually bankrupt.  
The publication of the “debunking” videos quickly followed Zhang’s death in 1995, 
showing the final death of the CCP’s grand experiment and its claim to spiritual authority more 
broadly. If Party members themselves had met and been healed by Zhang, the videos suggested, 
they had either also fallen victim to his tricks or were deliberately misleading the public. Both 
outcomes were damning to the pro-qigong faction of the CCP. And finally breaking the “three 
Nos” policy, the ever-strengthening anti-qigong faction showed that masters outside an 
187 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​169-173.  
188 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​169.  
189 Kenneth G. Lieberthal and David M. Lampton, ​Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China 
(Barkley: University of California Press, 1992), 2.  
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ever-shrinking sphere of regulation would be subject to increasingly tight controls or virulent 
criticism. Even teachings that weren’t originally viewed as subversive, such as Zhonggong, were 
not exempted. Although a few schools remained legal,  qigong was pushed out of the cultural 190
mainstream.   191
Thus, the CCP failed in its attempt to work outwards from its experiments and build a 
broader ordered “body politic” of qigong. While the organizational structure of Zhonggong was 
not subversive, it ​disenchanted​ qigong, stripping away the religious​ ​elements of the practice, 
such as a moral framework and collective spiritual experience, that had served as the glue 
holding the entire movement together. Without these elements, qigong became a sham, treating 
extraordinary powers and spiritual experience more generally as a commodity that could be 
bought, sold, and instilled in the bodies of customers for a fixed fee. Emulating the Party’s 
experiments worked at first, but quickly collapsed as practitioners resisted and subverted the 
authority of its systematized, progressive, bureaucratic approach to extraordinary powers and 
spirituality in general. On the other hand, the spiritual experiences brought on by qigong 
practice, such as “qigong deviation,” proved extremely difficult to measure, categorize and 
control. In fact, the depth of these experiences suggested to practitioners that the state didn’t 
actually understand qigong. Thus, qigong went from a form of official culture  to an escape 192
from it. The fused paradigm that Yan, Zhang Zhenhuan, and Qian created and promoted ended 
up splintering apart again; their ordered body politic fell into disarray.  
 
190 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​182.  
191 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​174. Palmer makes the argument that qigong “failed to enter” the mainstream. However, I 
believe the widespread practice and state sponsorship shows that it was widely embraced and could be considered 
mainstream, even if it did face criticism as well.  
192 Kelly, “Representative Culture,”​ ​4.  
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The Rise of Falun Gong  
It is in this light that we can understand Falun Gong: as a reassertion of spirituality in and 
of itself, needing no outside validation and rejecting any outside control. Falun Gong (法轮功) 
translates to “dharma wheel practice” and is also known as Falun Dafa (法轮大法) or “Great 
Dharma Wheel Teaching.”  It was founded in 1992 by Li Hongzhi (1951-).  Although Li 193 194
largely modeled his thought on the earlier masters we’ve examined,  for our purposes, Falun 195
Gong broke with other qigong groups in three relevant ways. It rejected (1) their focus on 
extraordinary powers, (2) an ordered, scientific, political, and economic logic, and (3) a fused 
legitimizing framework. Instead, it taught (1) a broader religious perspective, (2) a decentralized, 
free, practitioner-centric model, and (3) a disregard for traditional Party and scientific 
gatekeepers. The combination of these three breaks with orthodoxy are what made Falun Gong 
so subversive, as they undermined all of the Party’s last two decades of work.  
First, although Li did claim to possess extraordinary powers, he foregrounded moral 
teachings, and taught that these powers only develop incidentally through moral practice and the 
development of one’s “heart nature” (​xinxing ​心性).  “It is of little use for someone at a low 196
level to acquire supernormal abilities,” Li claimed, “save for trying to employ these to show off 
his or her abilities in front of everyday people and hoping to become the stronger one among 
193 For a broad overview of Falun Gong that covers “redemptive societies” and popular religious movements, as well 
as their historical relation to the state, see: David Ownby, ​Falun Gong and the Future of China ​(Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 2008). For an analysis of the teachings themselves, see: Penny, ​The Religion of Falun 
Gong. ​Li Hongzhi’s writings are collected in two main compilations, ​China Falun Gong ​and ​Zhuan Falun ​(which 
translates to, “Turning the Dharma Wheel”). For ​China Falun Gong, ​see: Li Honzhi, ​China Falun Gong ​(New York: 
Universe Publishing, 1999); or Li Hongzhi, ​Falun Gong (Revised Edition) ​(Taipei, Taiwan: Yih Chuyun Book Co. 
Ltd., 2009). For ​Zhuan Falun, ​see: Li Hongzhi, ​Zhuan Falun, 3rd edition ​(Taipei, Taiwan: Yih Chyun Book Co., 
Ltd., 2002).  
194 Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong, ​9.  
195 Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong, ​123.  
196 Li, ​Falun Gong, ​7-8. 
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them. If this is the case, it indicates precisely that the person’s ​xinxing ​is not high and that it is 
right not to give him or her supernormal abilities.” In Li’s eyes, the craze for extraordinary 
powers was showboating, a bastardization of qigong. And as someone who understood the 
deeper religious truths of qigong, it pained him to see everyone’s fascination with them. “Some 
qigong ​masters feel awful during performances and want to cry afterward,” he pleaded. “Don’t 
force them to perform!”  197
Li also subverted the CCP’s regulation of masters’ bodies and the body politic by both 
repurposing the Party’s own scientific metaphors and bringing a broader, cosmological, 
explicitly religious background to his teachings. Zhang claimed, 
Going further beyond, one finds the existence of a larger cosmic body, which is              
totally different from this cosmic body of ours… [Buddhas, Daos, and Gods in the              
larger cosmic body] see us just like we see the Buddhas, Daos, Gods, humans, and               
things in a microscopic world of a microscopic cosmic body. So they belong to              
yet another system, which is incredibly huge… in their eyes you’re a            
microorganism and have nothing to do with them. That’s why many of our             
cultivators often feel the same way when they see scenes in rocks, sand, or even               
smaller microscopic particles.  198
 
While scientists and Party members may have believed they could unlock vast power by 
ordering and understanding masters’ bodies, Li revealed this to be ultimately 
insignificant. Having worked with the CQRS up to 1992,  Li must have been familiar 199
with their focus on microscopically measuring and understanding the body. Perhaps he 
intentionally used this metaphor in order to subvert this focus, showing that his 
cultivators understood their relative place in the universe, rather than just the elements 
that compose it. For Li, the practitioner was only a grain of sand in the vast cosmos, and 
197 Li, ​Falun Gong, ​7-8. 
198 Li Hongzhi, ​Falun Buddha Fa: Lectures in the United States ​(New York: Universe Publishing, 1997), 11-12. 
Also available online at ​www.falundafa.o​rg. 
199 Penny, ​The Religion of Falun Gong, ​10-11.  
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needed to understand themselves as such. Thus, the CCP’s approach to qigong was 
fundamentally misguided, not because of any technical reasons, but simply because it 
lacked the proper ​religious ​components.  
The religious elements of Li’s teachings naturally went deeper than these simple 
comparisons with the CCP’s version of qigong. According to Li, the body underwent 
deep transformation with the practice of Falun Gong. Yet paradoxically, this difference 
could not be detected. Li wrote that after sufficient practice, the body was: 
...no longer composed of its original substances, as it has undergone a            
change in its fundamental properties. But cultivators live and cultivate          
among everyday people and they can’t disrupt the way human society is.            
So this kind of change alters neither the body’s original molecular           
structure nor the sequence in which its molecules are arranged; it just            
changes the original molecular composition… A person thus transcends         
the five elements, having turned his or her body into one composed of             
substances from other dimensions.   200
  
Because the body was socially embedded, the standards with which society measured it 
would not be able to capture its change. On the surface, order would remain. But on a 
deeper level, the practitioner’s body transcended the material world by entering “other 
dimensions.” This emphasis on transcendence, running through much of Li’s thought, 
shows that his conception of qigong was, at its core, dualistic.  This dualism ran directly 201
counter to “bioenergy” and the harmony between “thought waves” and “matter 
waves”—concepts that were core to the official form of qigong. Thus, Yan’s underlying 
conception of spiritual practice broke down the order that orthodox qigong attempted to 
create.  
200 Li, ​Falun Gong, ​42-43.  
201 Naturally many elements of Falun Gong, such as the cultivation of ​gong ​energy, require non-dual 
presuppositions. It would be wrong to categorize Falun Gong as ​entirely ​dualistic. Still, the basic orientation of Li’s 
thought is much more towards spiritual transcendence of mundane reality, rather than a harmony between the two.  
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Li’s second and third differences with the Party—a decentralized network and lack of 
concern with Party gatekeepers—further subverted government control. Unlike other qigong 
groups, Falun Gong was not very hierarchical, nor did it cost anything. Practitioners were 
encouraged to study Li’s books and practice on their own. After their fall from grace in 1992, the 
group claimed that there were no offices or administrative systems like Zhonggong’s (or the 
Communist Party’s), and that they had officially disbanded.  Moreover, Falun Gong also took 202
special care not to commercialize their teaching, prohibiting fees for healing.  In the aggregate, 203
these activities aimed to make Falun Gong “invisible” to the state.  
As a result, Falun Gong broke away from government control and eventually protested 
their influence in qigong, with tragic results. After Zhonggong’s collapse, the State Sports 
Commission released an accreditation process for various qigong groups. They had to fill out 
forms on the origins, history, and content of their teaching (​gongfa ​功法), provide copies​ ​of 
books and materials, submit “scientific proof” of their school’s health benefits (with at least 30 
medical histories), and finally meet the committee in person.  While some smaller qigong 204
groups thus received accreditation, Zhonggong and Falun Gong were left off the list.  After all, 205
there was nothing to regulate; Falun Gong had no “body” of organization, and Li had no desire to 
lower himself to the Party’s level anyway. What the Party couldn’t measure, regulate, and 
control, it feared. This is the core reason behind the suppression of Falun Gong after its 1999 
Zhongnanhai demonstration.  
202 James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing," in ​The 
China Quarterly​, no. 171 (2002), 642. Tong makes the solid point that Falun Gong was incentivized to depict itself 
this way, whereas the CCP was incentivized to depict it as an organization (so that it could declare it illegal).  
203 Tong, "An Organizational Analysis,” 637 (esp. footnote 4).  
204 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​182.  
205 Palmer, ​Qigong Fever, ​182.  
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Thus, Falun Gong was the final death of the Party’s dream for qigong. It revealed that 
despite the Party’s past two decades of work, orderly regulation and powerful spirituality were 
incompatible. After 1999, qigong entered a new phase of conflict, radicalization, and 
suppression. Official forms of qigong were brought into the state, medicalized, and stripped of 
any potentially subversive elements. Falun Gong, meanwhile, was suppressed as an evil cult in 
China, but proliferated throughout the world and continues to advocate for its cause. There is 
plenty of scholarship on this period,  so there is no need to go into its dynamics here. The 206
powerful qigong that could allow people to bend steel rods, connect China back to its cultural 
roots, provide for the health of millions of practitioners, bring about a scientific revolution, 
mobilize society to achieve utopia, and bring about a new cosmic order was dead. So it’s here 
that, for our intents and purposes, the story must end.  
  
206 Ownby, ​Falun Gong and the Future of China; ​James R. Lewis, ​Falun Gong: Spiritual Warfare and Martyrdom 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Maria Hsia Chang, ​Falun Gong: The End of Days ​(New Haven, 
CN: Yale University Press, 2004); Danny Schlechter, ​Falun Gong's Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or "evil 
cult"? ​(New York: Akashic Books, 2000); Mickey Spiegel, ​Dangerous Meditation: China's Campaign Against 
Falun Gong ​(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002). There are also many reports from the United States 
Government and United Nations about the conflict.  
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Conclusion 
This capstone has attempted to uncover the roots of qigong and its relationship with the 
CCP. It examined how leaders within the CCP built various discourses, along with their personal 
convictions, into their definition of qigong. Through unpacking the messy contradictions that 
these leaders brought to the practice, it argued that their tragic quest for ordered spirituality drove 
both the rise of qigong and its fall from grace.  
At first, religious elements were embedded deep within scientific and Marxist thought 
systems, serving as a sort of glue that held together explanations of how qigong worked. Many 
leaders personally witnessed this element, often in the context of seemingly miraculous events, 
and were moved by it. Qigong satisfied a broader need for the leaders and the people of China 
more generally. It was deeply personal. It could help them make sense of their place in the world, 
harmonizing what it meant to be Chinese ​and​ modern ​and​ scientific ​and ​Marxist, giving them a 
sense of cultural belonging and tying them back to their communities after the dramatic upheaval 
of the Cultural Revolution. And it changed how they related to themselves as well, allowing 
them to understand their very own bodies and the deep, extraordinary power they contained. In 
tandem with this religious fulfillment, leaders of the early qigong movement maintained that they 
could systematically explain how qigong worked. Something so powerful needed to be 
controlled, and the only way it could be controlled was if it were measured, ordered, and 
understood first. As such, they constructed a fused paradigm of spirituality, political ideology, 
and science to systematize qigong.  
Yet qigong’s core, spiritual elements were either killed by systematization or resisted it. 
Zhonggong exemplified how when every element was demarcated and controlled, qigong 
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became commodified and disenchanted. The experiences it provoked were decried as 
“quackery,” “deviant,” or “schizophrenic” because the only tools that could measure them were 
destined to label them as such. Qigong deviation showed how subversive spiritual experiences 
were pathologized in this way. At the same time, popular resistance to this need for order drove 
the rise of Falun Gong. Falun Gong rejected ​all ​previous attempts at explanation, resorting to 
total religious transcendence as the only path to understanding. This caused the qigong sector to 
break apart, with masters, politicians, and scientists at odds where they once cooperated. Thus, 
qigong’s internal contradictions ripped it apart, with tragic consequences.  
If the story of qigong seems like some strange, exotic, “Eastern” phenomenon, it might 
be worth doing some self-examination, because there are many parallels between China in the 
1980s and America in the present. Even before COVID-19, our healthcare system has been under 
enormous strain due to privatization and the profit motive, just like China’s was in the 1980s. We 
face high costs, poor outcomes, and a web bureaucracy compared to other industrialized 
countries. The COVID-19 crisis has brought out these failings. America is not just undergoing a 
healthcare crisis, but a broader breakdown of community and cultural belonging as well. In the 
past few decades, deindustrialization and the Opioid Epidemic have devastated much of the 
country, hollowing out communities in much the same way that China’s withdrawal from state 
welfare destroyed Work Units. Broadly speaking, chronic instability is a fact of life for many. 
And culturally, the question of what it means to be “American” is just as pertinent as what it 
meant to be “Chinese.” Fierce debates over immigration have polarized both the political left and 
right, and serve as a proxy for thinking about cultural heritage, American identity, and belonging 
more generally. In the fields of health, spirituality, economics, and culture, many of the same 
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debates are raging here and now as they did there and then. COVID-19 has only added fuel to the 
fire.  
In response to both the long term problems described above and the immediate crisis of 
COVID-19, people have turned away from expected sources of help, such as the government or 
organized religion, and have begun to seek alternative approaches to bodily and spiritual health.
 Traditional religious affiliation has decreased, but those using mediation, yoga, and even 207
qigong have increased; the number of adults who used meditation for health and wellness tripled 
between 2012 and 2017.  Even the singer Lizzo led an online meditation session to deal with 208
the stress of COVID-19, focusing on reimaging one’s body as filled with love instead of fear.  209
Cultural icons, Instagram “influencers,” and athletes provide opinions and ways of thinking that 
permeate our ideas of science, politics and culture. Often, they’re looked to as both models and 
potential sources of help. Technology has reinforced this trend.  
For many people, President Trump is the charismatic, miraculous leader who has 
emerged to face these threats; he’s like Yan, Zhang, and Qian all rolled into one. Like Yan, he 
reveals new ways of thinking, harkening back to a traditional, uncorrupted American culture as a 
207 “Public Trust in Government Remains Near Historic Lows as Partisan Attitudes Shift,” Pew Research Center, 
Washington D.C. (May 3, 2017). 
https://www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-in-government-remains-near-historic-lows-as-partisan-attitud
es-shift/​; ​“U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious,” Pew Research Center, November 3, 2015, 
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-less-religious/​.  
208 Tainya C. Clark et. al, “Use of yoga, meditation, and chiropractors among U.S. adults aged 18 and over,” ​NCHS 
Data Brief, ​ no 325 (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 2018). 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db325-h.pdf​.​ And in another parallel to the early history of qigong, 
Scientists are diving into spiritual practices, producing experiments that have, for example, empirically proven the 
power of meditation (although these experiments have provoked many critiques from others in their fields). See: 
Bret Stetka, “Where’s the Proof that Mindfulness Meditation Works?” ​Scientific American, ​October 11, 2017. 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/wheres-the-proof-that-mindfulness-meditation-works1/​;  
209 Laura Bradly, “Lizzo Leads a COVID-19 ‘Mass Meditation’ on Instagram With One Flute, Many Crystals, and 
No Fear,” ​The Daily Beast, ​March 2020. 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/lizzo-leads-a-covid-19-mass-meditation-on-instagram-with-one-flute-many-crystals-
and-no-fear 
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fundamental source of strength. Trump cultivated himself according to the traditional American 
ideal, building a business empire, obtaining numerous women, and finally ascending to political 
apotheosis in the form of the presidency. As such, he possesses extraordinary powers, able to 
accomplish incredible feats—building thousand-mile long walls, achieving breakthroughs in 
foregin affairs, and even finding cures for COVID-19. Trump’s refusal to wear a mask fits into 
this picture, as there’s no way the ​Chinese ​virus can affect ​his ​body. Scientists cannot access 
transcendent perspective; they cannot understand his mysterious source of power, hidden deep 
within him. And like Yan’s early form of Qigong, leaders from various fields have united behind 
Trump and his ideological vision, blending together various discourses in their support. White 
Evangelical Christian leaders, especially, have united behind Trump.  Many leaders view him 210
as a (admittedly flawed) vessel for God’s will,  imbuing Trump with a spiritual authority much 211
like Yan’s. America’s true roots are Christian, and in the face of drastic change, Trump will 
preserve them.   212
Following Trump is transformational for his followers, allowing them to see an 
alternative system underlying reality. Like Zhang and Qian, Trump has revealed how traditional, 
isolated fields of knowledge like science are provisional at best. Proper political ideology can 
bend its so-called rules into a new, merged system of seeing reality that opens the possibility for 
societal rebirth. Just like in the qigong movement, there is vocal opposition to these actions from 
210 In fact, similar confluxes of religion, cultural heritage, charismatic power, and political ideology have been 
present in the United States since its inception. For an excellent history of these dynamics, which very much mirror 
those of the qigong movement, see: Francis Fitzgerald, ​The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America ​(New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2017). (See especially 302-319 for the formation of the “Moral Majority,” in my opinion 
the precursor of evangelical support for Trump.)  
211 Adam Gabbatt, “'Unparalleled Privilege': Why White Evangelicals See Trump as their Savior,” ​The Guardian​, 
January 2020. ​https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/11/donald-trump-evangelical-christians-cyrus-king​. 
212 Tom Mccarthy, “Faith and Freedoms: Why Evangelicals Profess Unwavering Love for Trump,” ​The Guardian, 
July 2019. ​https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jul/07/donald-trump-evangelical-supporters​. 
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those in the political and scientific establishment. But how could they and other “experts” 
understand COVID-19 when they failed to understand ailments like opioids for so long, their 
heads buried in the sand as people dealt with them on their own? The spiritual core of Trumpism 
is too powerful, and connects with people too deeply, to be discredited by these out of touch 
elites. Trump’s party increasingly supports this view, following his lead in attacking science, the 
media, and the “establishment.” Trumpism is about ​experience, ​and after witnessing Trump’s 
charismatic power, the experience is impossible to deny. 
With this newfound power, Trump and his allies have begun the process of reordering the 
body politic—restoring it to health—according to the new framework this experience provides. 
Just as  it was important for practitioners to first recognize and believe in Yan’s mystery virtue 
before they could progress, Trump’s authority is built into his new framework for seeing reality. 
Loyalty is crucial in this regard. As such, Trump has packed the judiciary with ideological 
supporters. Just like the organizations overseeing qigong groups, judges can decide which laws 
belong or don’t belong in the social body. Even during the present crisis, they are continuing to 
appoint judges who understand this new order while leaving vacant spots in the bureaucracy for 
officials who might challenge it.  Just like qigong, Trumpism truly is a spiritual mass 213
movement with transformational power on both individual and societal levels. Fusing personal 
charisma, witnessing, and cultural and religious thought, it can transform the perspectives of 
individuals as well as the body politic to be in line with a new order. At first glance, it seems a 
Trump rally is far from the conventional definition of a religious event. But so are 
power-emitting lectures.  
213Alison Durkee, “Mitch McConnell Pressures Judges to Retire so Trump Can Appoint Their Replacements,” 
Vanity Fair, ​March 2020. 
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2020/03/mitch-mcconnell-pressures-judges-to-retire-trump​. 
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If Trumpism rose like qigong, will it fall like it too? Could it implode under the weight of 
its own contradictions, revealing itself as morally bankrupt? Perhaps COVID-19 is the event that 
lays these contradictions bare (like the video exposing Zhang Hongbao), precipitating a total 
collapse of Trump’s political support and widespread social upheaval. After all, Trump has never 
faced such a test before, with so much at stake and so much pressure to perform his miraculous 
powers. A failure here could lay everything bare. But at the same time, perhaps Trumpism could 
go further, creating other “masters” after Trump. If it does, what will they look like? They could 
continue in line with their predecessor, like Zhang Hongbao followed Yan. Or, like Li Hongzhi 
and Falun Gong, they could break with Trumpism, claiming to have access to an ​even higher 
truth. How will people respond to either of these scenarios? If Trumpism collapses, his followers 
will almost certainly carry on, nurtured by the experiences they once had. And if new Trump-like 
masters emerge, will these people follow their new teachings? Challenge them? Subvert them? 
With such deep convictions at stake, will there be violence as there was in China? These 
questions are difficult to answer, a challenge to our imagination. But if qigong teaches us 
anything, it’s that when charisma, ideology, and spirituality merge to create a new reality, 




This spring, as I emerged from ​The Local ​coffee shop and walked up South Main street to 
class, I noticed a tiny sign in the window of ​Modern Beauty Salon​.​ ​I crossed the street to look at 
it. ​“Shen Yun 2020,” (shenyun wanhui ​神韻晚會), it declared in bold lettering​. ​I had heard of 
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Shen Yun, that it was an eclectic performance of traditional Chinese opera, acrobatics, dance and 
music. But I had also heard something else.​ ​Excited, I examined the sign more closely— sure 
enough, it was there, tucked away in the bottom right corner: “sponsored by Ohio Falun Dafa 
Association.”  This wasn’t the only poster in Oberlin. I found them posted inside ​Dave’s 214
Cosmic Subs, Manuel’s ​barbershop, and ​Ben Franklin’s.​ Striking up a conversation with the 
cashier at ​Ben Franklin’s, ​Krista, I asked  her about how she got her stack of flyers. “They just 
came around and dropped them off,” she said. “They were really adamant about me coming to 
see them. I wasn’t so sure about it, though. I’ve heard some things about them being a cult. Do 
you know anything about that?” she asked. I explained. “Oh wow,” she said, “yeah, they come 
back every year.” 
  
214 For Shen Yun’s official website, see:  ​https://www.shenyunperformingarts.org/spirituality/challenges-we-face​/ 
For Falun Gong’s, see: ​https://en.falundafa.org/​. 
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* Sources indicated with an asterisk are from CIA translations. Citation material for these 
sources is somewhat unclear, so I would encourage the reader to use the links and look at the 
documents themselves.   






Mao Zedong: Revolutionary and leader of the Chinese Communist Party. After defeating the 
Nationalists in 1949, held total power in the government. Initiated the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1962), an attempt to rapidly industrialize China that failed and resulted in mass starvation. 
Also led the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), a totalitarian, mass-style campaign of violence 
and terror that sought to wipe out China’s past, “rightist” thought, and anything else that 
undermined the CCP, replacing it with Mao Zedong Thought. Died in 1976. 
Deng Xiaoping: Became paramount leader after Mao, ousting Gang of Four (Maoist faction). 
Moderated party, introduced market mechanisms and new technocratic elements of governance. 
Zhang Zhenhuan: General and head of many departments regulating and researching qigong. 
Main advocate for qigong within the CCP. 
Qian Xuesen: Famous scientist who designed nuclear missiles for China after expulsion from the 
United States. Using his weight as a cultural icon like Einstein, he advocated for qigong. High 
ranking member of CCP (rises to Central Committee, the equivalent of the American presidential 
cabinet).  
 
Qigong Masters:  
Yan Xin: Qigong master/doctor who worked with CCP in the mid-80s. Allied with Zhang, 
became a celebrity Master and miracle worker before falling from grace in the 90s.  
Zhang Baosheng: Qigong master who Zhang Zhenhuan engaged in early 80s to perform in front 
of and heal Party members. 
Zhang Hongbao: Founder of Zhonggong, the largest qigong organization in the late 80s. 




Cultural revolution: 1966-1976 
Reform Era: 1977-2008  215
 
  
215 The Beijing Summer Olympics are often referred to as the end of China’s Reform period, and the beginning of a 
new, confident era for the country. Xi Jingping’s ascension to the presidency, and his anti-corruption campaign that 
solidified his power in 2012-2013, could also be used to periodize a shift.  
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Timeline 
 
1950s​: First modern  use of the term qigong by the People’s Liberation Army. Qigong is used 216
in military training, and Traditional Chinese Medicine (​Zhongyi ​中医) (TCM) is praised by Mao 
as “the treasure of the nation.” 
1950s-1970s​: “Barefoot Doctors” program brings Western medicine to the countryside, largely 
displacing TCM (despite official rhetoric). 
1976​: Mao Zedong dies; Cultural Revolution Ends. 
1978-1979​: Deng Xiaoping takes power and begins a more moderate period of governance. 
“Reform and Opening Up” begins. 
July​ ​1979​: A team of scientists, led by Lü Bingkui, claim “qi has a material basis and objectively 
exists.” Masters demonstrate their “extraordinary powers” (​teyi gongneng ​特异功能) to Party 
members in Beijing. The first research council, set up by Zhang Zhenhuan to investigate its 
military applications, follows in December. 
1981​: Lü and other scientists found the All-China Qigong Research Society (ACQRS), bringing 
together masters, scientists, and Party members for research into qigong. ​Nature ​magazine, 
China’s premier journal for science and technology, publishes its findings.  
March 1982​: Publication of “Document 19,” outlining tolerance of “acceptable” religious 
practices and setting them apart from “superstition” and “folk religion.” Qigong is not included. 
April 1982​: In response to infighting about qigong, the CCP arrives at “Three Nos” Policy: no 
publication, controversy, or criticism about qigong, but Zhang Zhenhuan and Qian win enough 
political support to continue to publish.  
1984​: Zhang Baosheng, a qigong healer, visits Zhongnanhai complex (where high ranking 
members of the CCP live) to heal Party members.  
1985-1986​: Yan Xin rises to fame. His school of qigong remains popular throughout the 80s.  
1986-1987​: Zhang Zhenhuan consolidates much of qigong research into the China Qigong 
Research Society (CQRS). He and Qian Xuesen found the China Somatic Science Society 
(CSSS) specifically to research extraordinary powers.  
1987​: Zhang Hongbao founds Zhonggong, which explodes in popularity through the late 80s and 
into the early 90s.  
June 1989​: Tiananmen Square.  
1990​: Qigong movement subject to increasing criticism. A skeptical journalist produces a video 
exposé of Yan Xin and Zhang Hongbao’s powers; however, the state blocks its publication due 
216 Naturally the term “modernity” is widely contested, and the seeds of modernity were sown during the Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912), but for the purposes of this essay and Daoist cultivation techniques, most pre-Republican 
developments are relatively inconsequential. For broader discussion of periods and modernity, see: Jonathan Spence, 
The Search for Modern China (second edition) ​(New York: Norton, 2013). I use Spence’s work frequently in 
sections where more background would be useful.  
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to Zhang Zhenhuan’s intervention. CQRS begins licensing groups and masters. Yan fails in 
“power-emitting” lecture and flees to the United States.  
1990s​: Underground publications begin to circulate, criticizing state intervention in qigong.  
1992​: Li Hongzhi founds Falun Gong. He visits and works with CQRS and receives an official 
designation as “master.” Falun Gong replaces Zhonggong as one of the most popular qigong 
schools.  
1994​: Zhang Zhenhuan dies.  
1995​: Exposé released. Zhonggong and Falun Gong lose accreditation (Li claims Falun Gong 
willingly left CCP). State support for extraordinary powers research ceases. 
1996-1999​: Prolonged conflict between state regulation and qigong groups. 
1997-1998​: Li becomes a US citizen and moves to New York, beginning international 
proliferation of qigong.  
1999​: Falun Gong practitioners surround Zhongnanhai complex in peaceful protest about a 
negative article published in the ​Sichuan Daily​. The government arrests, murders, and harvests 
the organs of many Falun Gong practitioners to sell in the international organ trade black market. 
End of unlicensed qigong in China. 
2006​: Zhang Hongbao dies in mysterious traffic incident in Arizona.   
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I have adhered to the honor code on this assignment. 
 
